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INTRODUCTION

In the world of charitable organizations in the United States,
donations are big business. In 2015, it was estimated that private
individuals donated over $350 billion, which accounted for
approximately two percent of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product.' While
impressive, this figure represents a somewhat static donation pie, as the
number of individual donations has not increased in the past few years,
and neither has the percentage. 2 Since the 1970s, the percentage of
giving has consistently remained at around two percent (peaking to 2.3
percent in 2001).' At the same time, the number of charitable
organizations registered with the U.S. government has grown quickly
over the last decade.' This means that although there is a lot of money
available, the competition for donations increases each year. Therefore,
it should come as no surprise that many charitable organizations have
turned to branding and trademarks in order to increase their ability to
capture a bigger share of the available dollars.'
Branding gives charities the ability to tell a story in a single
trademark. 6 Instead of just signing up for any old 5K run and happening
to wear a pink shirt, you are now part of a community that is running
"For the Cure."' As one of the larger charitable organizations to embrace
branding, the Susan G. Komen Foundation (the "Komen Foundation")
knows that being able to create a culture around one's mission increases

1.

See CHARITY NAVIGATOR,

Giving Statistics, http://www.charitynavigator.org/index.

cfm/bay/content.view/cpid/42 (last visited Sept. 12, 2016).
2. See Holly Hall, Eden Stiffman, Ron Coddington & Meredith Myers, Philanthropysurges
5.4% to Record $358 Billion, Says

'Giving USA',

CHRON.

OF PHILANTHROPY

(2015),

https://www.philanthropy.com/interactives/giving-usa-2015. Individual contributions in 2015 only
increased 0.1 percent over 2014. Id. See also Suzanne Perry, The Stubborn 2% Rate, CHRON. OF
PHILANTHROPY (Jun 17, 2013), https://www.philanthropy.com/article/The-Stubbom-2-GivingRate/154691.
3. Perry, supra note 3.
4. Brice S. McKeever, The Nonprojit Sector in Brief 2015, URBAN INSTITUTE, 2 (Oct.
2015),
http://www.urban.org/research/publication/nonprofit-sector-brief-2015-public-charitiesgiving-and-volunteering (reporting that the number of nonprofit organizations increased by almost
three percent from 2003 to 2013). From 2013 to 2015, the number of public charities increased from
954,476 to 976,948, an increase of approximately two percent. See id., I.R.S. Pub. 78 (2015).
5. See Josh Gerben, Why Your Nonprofit Should Obtain a Trademark for Its Name,
NONPROFITPRO (Mar. 18, 2016), http://www.nonprofitpro.com/post/nonprofit-obtain-trademarkname.
6. See Deven R. Desai, From Trademarks to Brands, 64 FLA. L. REV. 981, 983 (2012);
Katya Assaf, Brand Fettishism, 43 CONN. L. REv. 83, 85 (2010).
7.

See

Find

a

Race,

SUSAN

G.

KOMEN

RACE

FOR

THE

CURE,

http://apps.komen.org/raceforthecure/?utm source=komen.org&utm medium=ParticiapteLandingP
age&utm-campaign=FindARace (last visited Sept. 10, 2016).
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public giving; from 2010 to 2011, public contributions increased from
approximately $365 million to over $419 million.' Relatedly, the
embracement of branding has also led to the increased use of trademark
law to enforce the brand and marks and, unfortunately at times, overenforcement by large entities. For example, in 2010 the Komen
Foundation was lampooned in the media for being a trademark bully due
to its over-enforcement efforts of its trademark rights to "For the Cure".9
Although trademark bullying in the for-profit sector leads to serious
negative consequences for society, this is particularly the case in the
nonprofit sector.
Enforcement of legal rights imposes costs on the entities involved
in a dispute, but also on society itself.'o Although many charitable
organizations claim that they attempt to resolve trademark infringement
disputes in an amicable, non-litigious manner, this may not always be
possible." Once an organization sends a cease-and-desist letter to a
target, the target may decide to bring a declaratory judgment action
against the letter sender, like in FreecycleSunnyvale v. The Freecycle
Network.' 2 It is likely that The Freecycle Network had no desire to
litigate its infringement claim against FreecycleSunnyvale, but in the end
it had to, all the way to the Ninth Circuit.'" Legal fees spent on
trademark enforcement, litigation or otherwise, equates to less money

8. Ernst & Young, Consolidated Financial Statements and Supplemental Financial
Information, The Susan G. Komen Foundation, Inc., dba Susan G. Komen for the Cure and
Affiliates, Years Ended March 31, 2011 and 2010, With Report of Independent Auditors, 3
http://ww5.komen.org/uploadedFiles/Content/AboutUs/Financial/2011`%2OKomen%20Financial%2
OStatements%20FINAL(3).pdf.
9. Clifford M. Marks, Charity Brawl: Nonprofits Aren't So Generous When a Name's at
Stake,

WALL

ST.

J.,

Aug.

5,

2010,

at

Al,

available at

http://www.wsj.com/articles/

SB10001424052748703700904575390950178142586; Laura Bassett, Susan G. Komen Foundation
Elbows Out Other Charities Over Use of the Word 'Cure', HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 7, 2010),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/12/07/komen-foundation-charities-cure-n_793176.html;

The

Colbert Report (Comedy Central television broadcast Jan. 3, 2011), http://www.cc.com/videoclips/7b084t/the-colbert-report-tip-wag-susan-g-komen-foundation-spider-man-musical.
10. See Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social
Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575 (1997); Richard A. Posner, The Cost of
Rights: Implicationsfor Centraland Eastern Europe-Andfor the United States, 32 TULSA L.J. 1, 2
(1996).
11. Eric T. Rosenthal, Komen 'For the Cure' Trademark Protection Ignites Ire of Some
Breast Cancer Bloggers, ONCOLOGY TIMES (Dec. 31, 2010), http://mobile.joumals.lww.com/

Mr.
(citing
oncology-times/_1ayouts/1 5/oaksjoumals.mobile/post.aspx?blogld=2&postld=92
Blum's statement that "Komen has never sued any nonprofit over trademark infringement").
12. Freecyclesunnyvale v. Freecycle Network, Inc., No. C 06-00324 CW, 2006 WL 2827916
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2006).
13. FreecycleSunnyvale v. Freecycle Network, 626 F.3d 509 (9th Cir. 2010).
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being available to further the mission of the charitable organization.' 4
Not only that, but there are intangible harms that over-enforcement
brings in the nonprofit sector, including an increase in costs and a
reduction in the number of smaller charitable entities. These harms are a
serious concern because the success of any one charitable organization at
the expense of another may channel funding into a particular area of
concern for a portion of society, while leaving other areas underfunded
or without funding altogether. '5
As I have explored in previous work,' 6 the blame for this overenforcement of trademark rights can be in large part laid at the steps of
expanded rights under the federal trademark law, the Lanham Act.'"
Since the 1960s, amendments to the Lanham Act and judicial
interpretation of the law have led to an ever-micreasing expansion of the
scope of trademark rights." In the nonprofit space, this has led to cases
where the preferred winners of infringement cases are large, wellestablished organizations rather than smaller entities." At the same time,
case law suggests that charitable organizations need to be just as vigilant
with their trademark enforcement efforts as for-profit entities, or else
face charges of abandonment.20 All of this encourages large charitable
organizations to over-enforce their trademarks, particularly against
smaller entities. This is not to say that there are no legitimate reasons for
charitable organizations to enforce their trademark rights, such as when
fraudulent entities pass themselves off as the original charitable
organization and divert donations. 2' Rather, action needs to be taken to
stop the counter-productive cycle of over-enforcement so that charitable
organizations can focus on serious cases of infringement and reserve
14. See Bassett, supra note 10 (citing to Komen's spending of over one million dollars on
legal fees). See also CNN Wire, Keystone Wounded Warriors Sued for 'Unfair Competition' by
Wounded
Warrior
Project,
FOX43
(May
12,
2015,
10:51PM),
http://fox43.com/2015/05/12/keystone-wounded-warriors-sued-for-unfair-competition-by-woundedwarrior-project/ (citing founder of Keystone Wounded Warriors' statement that "what is most
unfortunate is that both charities have spent money in court that could have been better used helping
veterans").
15. See infra Part I.C.
16. See Leah Chan Grinvald, Contracting TrademarkFame?, 47 LOY. UNIV. CHI. L.J. 1291,
1305-13 (2016); Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 625, 632-40
[hereinafter Grinvald, Shaming].
17. Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-459, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.).
18. See Leah Chan Grinvald, Policing the Cease-and-DesistLetter, 49 U.S.F. L. REV. 409,
429 (2015) [hereinafter Grinvald, Policing].
19. See infra Part 11.B.1.
20. See infra Part II.B.2.
21. See infra Part I.A.
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their resources for their charitable missions.
To this end, I suggest that one realistic solution judges could adopt
is to require that trademark infringement pleadings include plausible
allegations of defendant's deceit, as well as plausible allegations of
source confusion.22 With these two heightened pleading requirements,
the typical charitable organization trademark infringement lawsuit would
be narrowed to the type that produces real harms to charitable
organizations-fraudulent entities whose intention is to divert donations.
In addition, due to unique attributes of charitable organizations, I revisit
a suggestion that I made in an earlier work, Shaming Trademark
Bullies.23 I suggest that charitable organizations may be particularly
susceptible to public shaming for trademark over-enforcement. Since
charities rely on the public's goodwill for donations, the reputational
damage that responsible shaming can bring to a charitable organization
may act as a dampener for future over-enforcement.24
The structure of my Article is as follows. In Part I, I explore
branding and trademarks in the charitable organization context and
examine the rise of "charitable brands." I also examine how enforcement
has led to over-enforcement and the serious harms that stem from this
charitable trademark bullying. I turn in Part II to a discussion of why this
over-enforcement may be occurring, and I argue that judicial
interpretation of the Lanham Act is in large part to blame. I discuss the
legal expansions that have taken place within trademark law over the last
century, as well as some of the main cases involving charitable
organizations that may be encouraging trademark bullying. Against this
backdrop, I propose my solutions in Part III, beginning with a set of
suggestions, as briefly outlined above, to take in the judicial setting and
then turn to my discussion of shaming in the nonprofit space. I will then
briefly conclude.
I.

CHARITABLE BRANDS

The history of charities and the promotion of charitable giving in
22. See infra Part ll.A. Suggesting that actionable confusion be limited to source confusion
revisits the same suggestion previously made by Professors Mark Lemley and Mark McKenna.

Mark Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413 (2010) (arguing that
courts should require actionable confusion to be limited to source confusion). In addition, Professors
McKenna and William McGeveran have argued that "confusion isn't everything," proposing
(among other proposals) that courts reduce the role of confusion in trademark infringement cases.
William McGeveran & Mark P. McKenna, Confusion Isn't Everything, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV.

253, 256 (2013).
23. Grinvald, Shaming, supra note 17, at 625.
24. See infra Part 11I.B.
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the United States is a long one. 25 The oldest surviving public charity in
the U.S. was founded in 1657,26 and from an early period, the U.S.
government encouraged such charities to exist and flourish.27 This
encouragement came through the form of tax relief, with the earliest
reference to public charities' tax exempt status found in the 1894 Tax
Act and then again in the 1909 Revenue Act. 28 Although the U.S.
government taxed corporations, it exempted public charities from this
requirement. 29 In addition, to encourage donations, the 1917 Revenue
Act allowed for individual tax deductions for the amounts given to taxexempt public charities.30 While the language and requirements for tax
exempt status has changed over the years, the basic principle of
encouraging the existence and support of charitable organizations
remains in the Internal Revenue Code today, embodied in Sections
501(c)(3) and (c)(4). 3 1
Currently, there are over 1.5 million nonprofit organizations
registered with the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) pursuant to
these sections. 3 2 As an aggregate, these nonprofit organizations represent
approximately five percent of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product,
contributing $905 billion to the U.S economy in 2013.33 That being said,
the word "nonprofit" is an umbrella term that captures a myriad of
different types of entities.34 In this Article, I will be focusing on one
particular type of nonprofit, the "public charity," or those that are
registered with the I.R.S. under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal
25.

See OLIVIER ZUNZ, PHILANTHROPY IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 8 (2014).

26.

See Rick Cohen, Infographic: Some UK Charities Don't Want to Replicate U.S.

Charitable System,

NONPROFIT

QUARTERLY

(Mar.

4,

2014),

https://nonprofitquarterly.org/

2014/03/04/infographic-some-uk-charities-don-t-want-to-replicate-u-s-charitable-system/
(identifying the oldest public charity in the United States as having been established in 1657). This
is the Scots' Charitable Society of Boston. See SCOT'S CHARITABLE SOCIETY, https://scots-

charitable.org/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2016) (referring to themselves as "the oldest charitable
organization still existing in the Western Hemisphere").
27.
See PAUL ARNSBERGER, MELISSA LUDLUM, MARGAR-ET RILEY & MARK STANTON, A
HISTORY OF THE TAX-EXEMPT SECTOR: AN SO] PERSPECTIVE, STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN

105 (Winter 2008).
28. Id. at 106.
29.

ZUNZ, supra note 26, at 10.

30.
31.

Id.
INT. REV. CODE (West 2016).
32.
Quick Facts About Nonprofits, NATIONAL CENTER FOR CHARITABLE STATISTICS,
http://nces.urban.org/statistics/quickfacts.cfi (last visited Sept. 10, 2016) (citing 1,571,056 taxexempt organizations).
33.
McKeever, supra note 5, at 1.
34. See Exempt Purposes Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3),
https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/charitable-organizations/exempt-purposes-internal-

revenue-code-section-501c3 (last visited Sept. 10, 2016).

IRS,
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Revenue Code.35 Public charities typically rely on donations to support
their charitable work.3 6 As examples, over ninety-five. percent of the
Komen Foundation's annual revenue in 2015 and seventy-six percent of
Livestrong's 2014 annual revenue came from public contributions.37
Although there is a lot of money at stake with public donations,
there is also fierce competition for this money due to a variety of
reasons.3 8 For one, the number of entities competing for such donations
is increasing. From 2003 to 2013, public charities increased
approximately 19.5 percent from 798,988 registered entities to
954,476.39 And in 2015, the number of registered public charities
increased to 976,948, which represents approximately a two-percent
increase from 2013.40 Another reason for fierce competition is that there
are quite a number of different entities, such as human services, arts,
education, health services, public-benefit, and religious, that all compete
for the same pool of funds. 4 1 In order to more effectively compete for
this limited amount of money, many public charities have increased their
marketing efforts.42 This has included the greater use of branding and
trademarks, which will be explored in Part A below. In Parts B and C, a
related phenomenon of over-enforcement of a charity's trademark and
the harms such over-enforcement causes will be addressed.
A.

The Rise of the "CharitableBrand"

Branding is more than one's trademark: "[a] brand is a
psychological construct in the minds of all those aware of the branded

35. Public charities are defined by the I.R.S. as "churches, hospitals, qualified medical
research organizations affiliated with hospitals, schools, colleges and universities, [that] [h]ave an
active program of fundraising and receive contributions from many sources, including the general
public, governmental agencies, corporations, private foundations or other public charities." Public
Charities, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/charitable-organizations/public-charities

(last visited Sept. 10, 2016).
I
Charitable Donations,
on
of
Competition
Effects
Bose,
36. Bijetri
https://econ.washington.edu/sites/econ/files/old-site-uploads/2014/1 I/Bose.jmpaper.pdf.
15, http://ww5.komen.org/
37. See 2014 I.R.S. Form 990, SUsAN G. KOMEN
uploadedFiles/_Komen/Content/AboutUs/FinancialReports/KomenParent 990 FYE3-31-

15PICSignedCopy-with-efile-acceptance.pdf; 2014 Form 990, Schedule A, THE LIVESTRONG
FOUNDATION 2, http://images.livestrong.org/downloads/flatfiles/who-we-are/our-strength/financial-

info/2014_Form_990 LivestrongOFoundation.pdf.
38.
39.

See Bose, supra note 37, at 1.
McKeever, supranote 5, at 3.

40. I.R.S. Pub. 78 (2015).
41. See the numbers - 'Giving USA 2016' Infographic, GIVING USA (June 23, 2016),
http://givingusa.org/see-the-numbers-giving-usa-2016-infographic/.
42. Bose, supra note 37, at 2.
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product, person, organization, or movement." 43 Professor Deven Desai
sums it up succinctly with an example of Coke: "Coke's brand also has
an emotional, symbolic component, as the brand evokes a sense of being
all-American, 'Classic,' and the perfect refreshing drink, whether it is
the Fourth of July or Christmas. A sip of Coke means imbibing an entire
culture."" Branding is used to distinguish oneself from competitors and
to attempt to bond consumers to the branded entity for life. 45 An
example of this can be seen in Samsung's advertisements of its Galaxy
phones. 46 To differentiate itself from the Apple brand and its product,
the ubiquitous iPhone, Samsung ran a series of commercials where it
positions its customers (and by extension itself) as young, hip, and funloving.47 In fact, in a number of different commercials, Samsung sends
the message that if you're young (or even young at heart) you will have
a Samsung Galaxy instead of an iPhone.4 8
In contrast to for-profit entities, charitable organizations are
latecomers to the trademark and branding space. Although charitable
organizations have long been aware of the need to prevent fraudulent
uses of names similar to their own,49 the acknowledgement of the
importance of an organization's name as a trademark, and further as a
brand, has only been around since the 1960s and 1990s, respectively.o
Although the 1946 Lanham Act gave all entities, including charitable

43.
STAN.

Nathalie Kylander & Christopher Stone, The Role of Brand in the Nonprofit Sector,
Soc.

INNOVATION

REV.,

Spring

2012,

http://ssir.org/articles/entry/

the-role-of brand-in-thenonprofitSector.
44.

Desai, supra note 7, at 983.

45.

Id. at 990 ("Many companies encourage consumers to see a brand as having a personality

and to accept the idea that owning a branded good connects the consumer to the brand in some deep,
personal way.").
46. See
Samsung
Mobile
USA,
YOUTUBE,
https://www.youtube.com/user/

samsungmobileusa/videos (last visited Sept. 10, 2016).
47. See,
e.g.,
Samsung
Galaxy
S7:
Champagne
Calls,
YOuTUBE,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=15aF23XpBwU (last visited Sept. 10, 2016).
48. Samsung
Makes
Fun
of Apple!
In
New
Commercial,
YOuTUBE,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-fKunpnL4g0w (last visited Sept. 10, 2016) (showing the young
graduates at the pool party with the Samsung smartphone and the older parents with the iPhone).
Samsung's advertising campaign appears to have paid off, as it was ranked as the number one

trusted brand with Millennials. See Chris Matyszczyk, You '1 Never Guess Which Brand Millennials
Trust the Most, INC. (June 9, 2016), http://www.inc.com/chris-matyszczyk/youll-never-guesswhich-brand-millennials-trust-the-most.html.

49. See, e.g., In re First Presbyterian Church of Harrisburg, 2 Grant Cas. 240, 1858 WL 7632
(Pa. 1858) (holding that a second-comer Presbyterian Church of Harrisburg would confuse the
public).
50.

1 base this "acknowledgement" on the apparent rise in trademark registrations for

charitable name marks with the USPTO office in the 1960s (statistics on file with author) and in the
rise of nonprofit branding literature in the 1990s. See infra note 56.
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organizations, the right to register their distinctive names as trademarks,
many did not take advantage of this until after approximately the 1960s.
It was in around the 1960s that records showed charitable organizations
began to register their trademarks in greater numbers with the U.S.
Patent & Trademark Office." While trademark registration is not a
prerequisite for protection in the U.S., registration is a sign that an entity
is taking its trademark rights more seriously.5 2 In particular, a federally
registered trademark gives its holder a nationally-recognized right to the
53
mark without having to use the mark in all jurisdictions of the U.S.
Without a federally-registered trademark, an entity needs to rely on more
narrowly-circumscribed common law to protect its trademark.54
The rise of the charitable brand came even later, appearing in the
late 1980s and 1990s. This can be seen through a number of different
sources, including the appearance of industry journals and articles
discussing the idea of branding. 5 This late start to branding may stem
from the fact that branding was seen as more of a commercial corporate
marketing idea rather than a nonprofit one. 5 6 However, with the
increased need to fundraise even during economic downturns, along with
rising numbers of nonprofit employees who once worked in the
corporate world, many large charitable organizations have embraced the
concept of branding.57 This embracement of branding is most visible in
the healthcare type of public charity. These organizations raise public
funds for medically related causes such as cancer, Hodgkin's lymphoma,

51. See Statistics on File with Author. For example, a number of well-established charities
did not file for a trademark registration until the 1960s. See, e.g., The Salvation Army, Registration
No. 0807044 (issued Apr. 12, 1966).
52.

See Gerben, supra note 6.

53.
54.

See 15 U.S.C.A. §1057(c) (West 2010).
See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 98 (1918) ("It results that

the adoption of a trade-mark does not, at least in the absence of some valid legislation enacted for
the purpose, project the right of protection in advance of the extension of the trade, or operate as a
claim of territorial rights over areas into which it thereafter may be deemed desirable to extend the
trade.").

55. See Information for and About Nonprofit Organizations, Top Nonprofit Journals,
http://guides.lib.umich.edu/c.php?g-283253&p=1886821 (listing various nonprofit journals that
began in the late 1980s and 1990s). For example, the International Journal of Nonprofit and
Voluntary Sector Marketing began in 1999 and is focused on marketing in the nonprofit sector. See

Mirlyn Catalog, International Journal of Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Marketing, Subjects,
https://mirlyn.lib.umich.edu/Record/004371474/Subjects#tabs (last visited June 20, 2017).
56. See Kylander & Stone, supra note 44 ("The models and terminology used in the
nonprofit sector to understand brand remain those imported from the for-profit sector to boost name
recognition and raise revenue.").
57. See Alan Tapp, Charity Brands: A QualitativeStudy of Current Practice, I J. NONPROFIT
& VOLUNTARY SECTOR MARKETING 328, 328 (1996).
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Parkinson's, diabetes, and birth defects, just to name a few.58
Interestingly, this type of organization appears to have a high number of
competitors, which may explain the prevalence of strong brands within
this sector.59
The charitable brand has meant not only designing an evocative
logo that lets potential donors know to whom they are donating, but also
implementing a psychological connection with donors.
This
psychological connection is strengthened through story-telling. For
example, many charitable organizations' marketing pamphlets contain
stories about the real-life people, animals, or nature preserves that the
donors' funds are going toward. 6 1 Through these stories, charitable
brands are conveying trust (we are using your money to help person A)
and evoking emotion (person A's life was saved because of you), both of
which are keys in fostering the psychological connection. 62 Just as with
for-profit brands, charitable brands' efforts can tie their donors to the
brand and create an everlasting cycle of donations through loyalty.63
Related to the rise of the charitable brand and a greater use of the
trademark registration system is an increased rise in trademark
enforcement efforts. The full extent to which such enforcement efforts
have increased is unclear, as much of trademark enforcement is done
extra-judicially through cease-and-desist letters or even more informally
through phone calls.' However, there has been what appears to be a
statistically significant increase in enforcement efforts since the early
2000s. 65 Although enforcement efforts in the for-profit sector have also
increased, the increase in efforts in the nonprofit sector is telling

58. See, e.g., AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, http://www.cancer.org (For an overview of
Hodgkin's Lymphoma, see What is Hodgkin's Lymphoma?, AMERICAN CANCER SOC[ETY,
http://www.cancer.org/cancer/hodgkin-lymphoma/about/what-is-hodgkin-disease.html (last updated
Mar. 28, 2017); PARKINSON'S DISEASE FOUNDATION, http://www.pdf.org/; AMERICAN DIABETES
ASSOCIATION, http://www.diabetes.org/; MARCH OF DIMES, http://www.marchofdimes.org/.

59.

See

2016

Harris Poll

EquiTrend Rankings,

THE

HARRIS

POLL

http://www.theharrispoll.com/equitrend-rankings/2016#Non-Profits
(ranking
thirteen
nonprofits versus around five nonprofits in other categories).
60.
See Kylander & Stone, supra note 44.
61. See,
e.g.,
LIVESTRONG
FOUNDATION,
2014
ANNUAL
REPORT
http://images.1ivestrong.org/downloads/flatfiles/who-we-are/our-strength/financial-

(2016),
health

1-5,

info/LIVESTRONG_2014AR.pdf (highlighting stories of supporters of, and instructors in,
Livestrong programs).
62.

See Tapp, supra note 58, at 331.

63.

See id.

64.
65.

See Grinvald, Policing, supra note 19, at 41.
LexMachina.com (conduct a quick search using the term "nonprofit" and narrow to

trademark only cases). The case numbers grew from three in 2005 to forty-seven in 2010.
LexMachina search results on file with author.
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because, of the two sectors, the nonprofit sector is the least likely to be
able to afford such efforts. The next section will discuss this rise in
enforcement efforts, which have unfortunately led at times to overenforcement.
B.

Enforcement Efforts Leading to Over-Enforcement

As mentioned previously, charitable organizations are not new to
the enforcement arena. One of the oldest documented disputes relating to
a charitable organization is from 1858, when the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania denied a charter to the First Presbyterian Church of
Harrisburg on the grounds that it was too similar to an older church, The
English Presbyterian Congregation of Harrisburg. 66 Interestingly, the
court held that the similarities were not necessarily in the way the formal
names were registered, but in the manner in which the public referred to
the older church as the "Presbyterian Church in Harrisburg." 6 ' This was
enough to find the potential for confusion, as the court seems to be
hypothesizing about how the public would perceive the two
congregations.6 1 Cases from the same era are similar in nature and
mirror disputes from the commercial sector, which are those centered
around entities using the same name (or a very similar sounding name)
for the same purpose. 69 One reason for this is that the law of unfair
competition (the grounds on which these cases were typically decided)
and, by extension, trademark law, was narrowly applied, which likely
disincentivized cases based on broader infringement theories.70 I will
discuss in more depth how the law encourages trademark enforcement
efforts in Part II below.
Looking at the reported cases, it appears that formal (and by
extension, informal) trademark enforcement began to increase in the
1980s." While from the time period of 1858 to 1979 there was an
average of 1.76 cases per decade involving trademark-related disputes,

66. First Presbyterian Church of Harrisburg, 2 Grant 240, 1858 WL 7632 (Pa. 1858).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Colonial Dames of America v. Colonial Dames of State of New York, 60
N.Y.S. 302 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1899) [hereinafter Colonial Dames]; In re Duquesne College, 2 Pa. D.
555 (Pa. 1891) [hereinafter Duquesne].
70. In addition, it is likely, as it is today, that many disputes never make it to the litigation
stage and are settled informally and extra-judicially. See Grinvald, Policing, supra note 19, at 41618.
71. Westlaw (search with the string, "advanced: charit! & DA(aft 12-31-1979 & bef 01-011990) & "trademark"") returns eighteen relevant cases.
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in the 1980s alone, there were at least sixteen.72 This increase in
enforcement appears to track the rise in public awareness of charitable
organizations and attention to the need for public donations due to a cut
in government services. 73 As such, the market for public donations
heated up in the 1980s, and competition typically brings increased
strife.7 4
Some of this strife is required in a way, as there are situations
where a third-party entity is intentionally utilizing a charitable
organization's name or similar name for fraudulent purposes. The
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) attempts to police these types of
fraudulent entities and educate the public about them, but the party best
situated to enforce (or report to the FTC) is the charitable organization
itself.75 A related type of required enforcement practice is seen where a
third-party entity does not adopt its name for the intentional purpose of
misleading the public, but it has the effect of doing so, and the thirdparty entity takes no action to stop it.
This was the case in the dispute between WWP, Inc. and Wounded
Warriors Family Support, Inc. 76 WWP, Inc. (doing business as the
Wounded Warriors Project) was established in 2002 in Florida, and
Wounded Warriors Family Support (Family Support) was established in
2003 in Germany. In 2004, Family Support re-incorporated in the U.S.
and started a new website, woundedwarriors.org.77 Prior to this move
and new website, Family Support's average monthly contribution had
been $1,337. After the move and site launch, that amount jumped to
$87,895 per month.7 1 Unfortunately, a good portion of this amount was
due to confusion on the part of donors as to which entity they were
donating. In 2007, Wounded Warriors Project brought a lawsuit against
Family Support and won a jury verdict with a fairly large damages
award, which was later affirmed by the Eighth Circuit.79
What makes the Wounded Warriors Project case "required"
enforcement is not just the similarity in names and the competition

72.

Statistics on file with author.

73.

See Elizabeth T. Boris, Myths About the Nonprofit Sector, in 4 CHARTING CIVIL SOCIETY

1 (July 1998).
74. See Bose, supra note 37, at 1.
75.

Charity Scams, FTC, https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/features/feature-00 I1-charity-scams

(last visited Sept. 10, 2016).
76. WWP, Inc. v. Wounded Warriors Family Support, Inc., 628 F.3d 1032 (8th Cir. 2011).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. WWP, Inc. v. Wounded Warriors, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 2d 970 (D. Neb. 2008); Wounded
WarriorsFamily Support, 628 F.3d 1032.
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between the two organizations for donation funds. In fact, while Family
Support was still based in Germany, Wounded Warrior Project asked if
Family Support wanted any marketing assistance, which is indicative of
the ability of two different organizations with two similar names to work
together for similar causes.s In addition, "wounded warrior" is a generic
term that is used in the military to refer to injured soldiers." Rather,
what makes this case "required" enforcement was that even once aware
of the potential for confusion, Family Support made no apparent efforts
to ensure that donations intended for Wounded Warrior Project were rerouted to the Wounded Warrior Project. 82 In addition, Family Support
made no efforts to educate the public regarding the differences between
the organizations." Instead, Family Support appeared to have simply
cashed any and all checks that were mailed to it, regardless of whether
there were obvious signs that a donation was not intended for Family
Support.84 Therefore, it appears that while Family Support did not start
out with the intent to deceive the public, the effect was to defraud the
public by not taking actions to reverse the deception.
While Wounded Warriors Project is a case of good enforcement,
unfortunately, it appears that WWP, like some other large charitable
organizations, has begun to take enforcement efforts too far. WWP, the
Komen Foundation, and Livestrong, to name a few, have been described
as "trademark bullies."" I have defined trademark bullying in previous
work as "the enforcement of an unreasonable interpretation by a large
corporation of its trademark rights against a small business or individual
through the use of intimidation tactics." 86 Although I applied this
definition to the for-profit sector in my previous work, the same
definition holds true in the nonprofit sector. Large charitable
organizations have been targeting smaller nonprofits in an attempt to
enforce unreasonable interpretations of their trademark rights against
these smaller entities in an intimidating manner.
For example, in 2010, the Komen Foundation began a campaign to
enforce its trademarks against smaller, unrelated entities that use their

80.
81.

Wounded Warriors Family Support, 628 F.3d at 1036.
Ruth McCambridge, Is Wounded Warrior Project a 'Neighborhood Bully' Among

Veterans' Groups?, NONPROFIT QUARTERLY (May 5, 2015), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/
2015/05/05/is-wounded-warrior-project-a-neighborhood-bully-among-veterans-groups/.

82.
83.
at 1042.
84.
85.
86.

Wounded WarriorsFamilySupport, 628 F.3d at 1036-37.
The court called the disclaimer that Family Support had on their website as "anemic." Id.
Id. at 1037.
See McCambridge, supra note 82.
Grinvald, Shaming, supra note 17, at 642.
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"for a Cure" or "for the Cure" language. 7 What makes this trademark
enforcement bullying behavior is that the Komen Foundation is a large
organization" targeting smaller charitable organizations through the use
of the opposition procedure at the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office
(USPTO), as well as by sending intimidating cease-and-desist letters.8 9
Although the General Counsel of the Komen Foundation describes their
enforcement tactics as "nice," the perception of intimidation is present
when a small nonprofit is on the other side of the letter. This is
particularly the case where the small nonprofit is volunteer-based, like
"Mush for a Cure," whose founder reported that she "had to call the
trademark helpline, because I had no idea what I was doing."90 In
addition, the Komen Foundation has been attempting to enforce an
unreasonable interpretation of their trademark: although their marks are
"Susan G. Komen For the Cure," 9' "Race for the Cure,"92 and "For the
Cure," 93 a number of their enforcement efforts have been over variations
such as "for a Cure." 94 Further, the "For the Cure" mark, which is what
provides the Komen Foundation with the ability to claim a limited
exclusive right in such phrase, is registered in International Class 016,
specifically for "Newsletters on the subject of breast cancer research and
issues related thereto." 9 s All of the other marks that the Komen
Foundation has taken issue with thus far have been in International Class
036, the class of products used for charitable fundraising services. 96
Much, if not most, of this bullying occurs extra-judicially, as many
of these enforcement actions take place through cease-and-desist letters
and never make it to the litigation stage. 9 7 The reason for this is that for
the most part, smaller charitable organizations do not have the resources
to fight back against a trademark bully. 98 For example, when the
87.

See Bassett, supra note 10 (reporting from 2010). But it appears that the Komen

Foundation was bullying other organizations as early as 2008. See Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board Inquiry System, TTABVUE (Query: 75724729) (showing results for all oppositions where
"For the Cure" is used as grounds to oppose other trademark applications) (on file with author).
88. See 2014 I.R.S. Form 990, supra note 38. In 2015, the Komen Foundation had over $254
million in net revenue and maintained over $177 million in assets.
89.
See Bassett, supra note 10 (reporting reactions from targeted small charities upon

receiving the Komen Foundation's cease-and-desist letters).
90. Id.
91. SUSAN G. KOMEN FOR THE CURE, Registration No. 3,309,532.
92. RACE FOR THE CURE, Registration No. 1,593,469.
93. FOR THE CURE, Registration No. 2,362,027.
94. See TTABVUE results, supranote 88.
95. FOR THE CURE, supra note 94.
96. See TTABVUE results, supra note 88.
97.
98.

See Grinvald, Policing, supra note 19, at 418.
Many smaller charitable organizations operate on a volunteer basis, with all the funds
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'

Sunshine Kids Foundation, a Texas-based charity focused on children's
cancer causes, sent a cease-and-desist letter to the Sunshine Kids Club of
California, a new charity focused on helping children with cerebral
palsy, the smaller California entity decided to simply change its name
after negotiations with the larger Texas entity broke down. 99 However,
even when a smaller entity decides to forego a legal battle with a larger
entity, there are still costs associated with a name change. As the founder
of Sunshine Kids Club of California stated, "It's a lot of work to rebrand
yourself."' 0 In addition, the non-judicial nature of these disputes is
misleading, as a number of these disputes are in the form of oppositions
filed in the USPTO. For example, the Komen Foundation has filed at
least seventeen oppositions to other applications that use "for a Cure" in
their mark. Although opposition proceedings at the USPTO are not as
expensive as full-blown litigation, there are still legal costs involved in
defending a registration application.' 0
Even when targeted entities want to fight back against a charitable
trademark bully, they may not have the resources to fight all the way to
the end. Once litigation has begun, it is hard to extricate yourself from
it.' 02 If an entity is sued in court, it must mount a legal defense or face a
' Default judgments can happen even if the founders
default judgment. 03
of the nonprofit attempt to defend the lawsuit pro se, as entities are not
allowed to defend themselves pro se; only individuals may do so.'04
Unless the charitable organization can find pro bono counsel, it is likely
that a lawsuit will mean the organization will need to change its name.ios
For example, Keystone Wounded Warriors utilized $72,000 over the
course of two years to fight back against WWP out of an annual budget
raised going towards funding the services of the organization. See WOMEN 4 WOUNDED WARRIORS,

http://womenforwoundedwarriors.org/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2016) ("100% Dedication - 100%
Volunteer - 100% of dollars donated go to the cause. We don't spend or waste your donations. All
of the money and goods go directly to those in need.").
99.

100.

See Marks, supranote 10.

See id. (quoting founder of Sunshine Kids California).

101. See Paul F. Kilmer, The Value Equation of Trademark Oppositions: A Multinational
Comparison of Costs and Perceived Benefits, 68 INTA BULLETIN 5 (Mar. 1, 2013),

http://www.inta.org/INTABulletin/Pages/TheValueEquationofTrademarkOppositionsAMultinationa
IComparisonofCostsandPerceivedBenefits.aspx.
102. See Grinvald, Shaming, supra note 17, at 647.
103. See Rebecca Callahan, Arbitration v. Litigation: The Right to Appeal and Other
Misperceptions Fueling the Preferencefor a Judicial Forum, at 7-8 (Bepress, Legal Series, Paper

No. 1248, 2006).
104. Rowland v. California Men's Colony, Unit It Men's Advisory Council, 506 U.S. 194,
201-02 (1993) ("It has been the law for the better part of two centuries, for example, that a
corporation may appear in the federal courts only through licensed counsel.").
105. See Marks, supra note 10 (referencing the HEADstrong dispute with Livestrong).
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of approximately $200,000.106 In the end, it had to settle and change its
name to Keystone Warriors. 10 7
In the next section, I argue that the costs caused by trademark overenforcement in the nonprofit sector are serious. The two harms I discuss
as being particularly serious are the increase in costs, legal and nonlegal,
both to society and to the individual charitable organizations, in addition
to the reduction in the number of charitable organizations. An increase in
costs burdens smaller organizations asymmetrically, with smaller
charities needing to utilize a greater percentage of their revenue for legal
costs. Additionally, smaller organizations are more likely to be burdened
with nonlegal costs, such as the emotional strain that comes with legal
wrangling. Further, a reduction in the number of charitable organizations
is alarming because smaller charities play an essential role in society. It
is oftentimes the smaller charitable organizations that champion less
well-known causes, such as orphan diseases, or unpopular conditions,
like mental health. These smaller organizations also play a
complementary role to larger entities, providing different but related
services, as well as serving local needs. Therefore, I argue that we
should be particularly cognizant of the harms that charitable trademark
bullies produce.
C.

CounterproductiveCharitableTrademarks

Abusive enforcement of legal rights, whether judicially or nonjudicially, causes a number of externalities that society is forced to
absorb.os I have argued previously that these costs in the for-profit
sector include increased operating and societal costs, a reduction in
marketplace competition, and a reduction in the freedom of speech.' In
the non-profit sector, similar harms plague society, which I will discuss
below.
1. Increased Costs
One of the hidden harms that stems from abusive enforcement of

.

106. Wounded Warrior Project, Inc. v. Keystone Wounded Warrior, Case No. 5:14-CV-05565
(E.D. Pa. filed Sept. 29, 2014).
107. Keystone Warriors, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/KeystoneWarriors/ (last
visited Sept. 10, 2016).
108. See Richard A. Posner, The Cost of Rights: Implicationsfor Centraland Eastern Europe
- And for the United States, 32 TULSA L.J. 1, 2 (1996) ("The enforcement of legal rights consumes
real resources, including ... indirect costs to the extent that rights are enforceable against socially
productive activities, or impose socially burdensome duties, or protect socially harmful activities.").
109. See Grinvald, Shaming, supranote 17, at 650-52.
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legal rights comes in the form of increased costs to individual
organizations and to society as a whole."'o When a large charitable
organization decides to enforce an unreasonable interpretation of its
trademark rights in an intimidating fashion against a smaller charitable
organization, both sides of the dispute incur costs."' There are
straightforward legal costs involved, which include the payment of
attorney fees and court costs (if the dispute proceeds to litigation), in
addition to hidden non-legal costs. These non-legal costs include
emotional strain and the time and energy required to deal with legal
disputes.

12

Both types of costs asymmetrically burden smaller organizations.
With regard to legal costs, the larger organization has the ability to
control its level of costs ex ante." 3 For example, the larger organization
may decide ahead of time that a particular dispute is not worth spending
a lot of money on and therefore may cap the extent of its enforcement
action with respect to that dispute. With this enforcement budget in
mind, the larger organization may then send out a cease-and-desist letter
to the target and, regardless of whether the larger organization is
successful in achieving compliance with its demands, drop the dispute
when the budget has been spent.1 4 The smaller organization, not having
110.

See generally Louis Kaplow, Private Versus Social Costs in Bringing Suit, 15 J. LEGAL

STUD. 371 (1986) (discussing the externalities to society from private litigation).
Ill. See AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW ASS'N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 3436 (2013) [hereinafter AIPLA 2013 REPORT] (reporting that in 2013, costs associated with
intellectual property litigation ranged from $300,000 to $6,000,000, depending on the type of case
and value).
112. See Marks, supra note 10 (quoting one small charity organization's founder who was

considering a name change because of a legal dispute with the Lance Armstrong Foundation, "I just
can't stand the stress and anxiety and the wasted effort.").
113. As the instigator of the enforcement action, the larger organization has the ability to
execute its enforcement strategy within the budgetary limits it has placed. In addition, it is likely
that the instigator of an enforcement action is a large organization. See Grinvald, Policing, supra
note 19, at 418 ("Although entities of all sizes enforce their legal rights, it appears that the larger the
company, the more likely it is to initiate court action or arbitration.").
114. For example, there are a number of instances where larger organizations may send out
cease-and-desist letters, the targets disagree with the demands in the letter, and larger organizations
have taken no further action. An example of this is the cease-and-desist letter that Louis Vuitton
sent to the University of Pennsylvania Law School over the law school group's use of a logo that
was similar to one of Louis Vuitton's trademarks. See Letter from Michael Pantalony, Dir. of Civil
Enforcement, Louis Vuitton Malletier, to Michael A. Fitts, Dean, University of Pennsylvania Law

School (Feb. 29, 2012), https://www.law.upenn.edulfac/pwagner/DropBox/lv_1etter.pdf The Law
School responded, declining to comply with Louis Vuitton's demands. See Letter from Robert F.

Firestone, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, University of Pennsylvania Law School, to Michael Pantalony, Dir.
2012),
2,
(Mar.
Malletier
Vuitton
Louis
Enforcement,
Civil
of
https://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/pwagner/DropBox/penn-ogcetter.pdf.

No further action was taken

after the law school responded. See Charles Colman, Intellectual Property Magazine 's May 2012
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the ability to information-gather, needs to take the cease-and-desist letter
seriously and should likely retain legal counsel."' Whether or not the
targeted organization can retain legal counsel is another matter.116
Should the targeted organization obtain legal counsel, the smaller
organization will likely need to spend a greater percentage of its annual
budget on its legal defense. For example, when the Wounded Warriors
Project attacked Keystone Wounded Warriors, Keystone Wounded
Warriors spent $72,000 in its legal defense, both at the USPTO and in
federal court."' This represented approximately eighteen percent of their
annual revenues (approximately $200,000), as compared with the annual
revenues of WWP (approximately $484 million in 2015)."1 An
interesting fact pointed out by the news media covering this story was
the comparison between the Keystone Warriors' annual revenue and the
annual salary of WWP's CEO, which in 2014 was approximately
$470,000.'19 Unfortunately, even after spending a significant amount of
money on a legal defense, the smaller organization will typically likely
decide to settle with the larger organization.120 This is what Keystone
Wounded Warriors eventually did, renaming themselves Keystone
Warriors. 121
The non-legal costs involved also asymmetrically burden smaller
organizations. Legal disputes can be emotionally charged for smaller
charitable organizations, whose founders are typically personally
invested in the organization's mission.122 In addition, legal disputes can
article on the Louis Vuitton-Penn Law School dispute, LAW OF FASHION (May 2, 2012),

http://lawoffashion.com/biog/story/05/02/2012/129.
115. See Grinvald, Policing, supra note 19, at 426 ("conducting effective informationgathering to obtain . . . information consumes resources . . . of which a low-resourced entity likely

has little.").
116. See Grinvald, Shaming, supra note 17, at 656-7 (discussing the various impediments to
finding legal counsel for small businesses).
117. Tim Mak, 'Wounded Warrior' Charity Unleashes Hell - On Other Veteran Groups, THE
DAILY
BEAST
(May
4,
2015,
10:00AM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/
2015/05/04/wounded-warrior-charity-unleashes-hell-on-other-veteran-groups.html.
118. See McCambridge, supra note 82.
119. See id.
120. See Mak, supra note 118.
121. See Keystone Warriors, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/KeystoneWarriors/ (last
visited Nov. 10, 2016). Interestingly, Keystone Warriors was able to keep their logo of the
silhouetted soldiers even though the CEO of WWP had stated, "Our logo is pretty sacred to us. It
represents everything we believe in as an organization." See CNN Wire, Keystone Wounded
Warriors sued for 'Unfair Competition' by Wounded WarriorProject, WPMT FOX43 (May 12,
2015,
10:51PM),
http://fox43.com/2015/05/12/keystone-wounded-warriors-sued-for-unfaircompetition-by-wounded-warrior-project/.
122. ALAN C. Fox, PEOPLE TOOLS FOR BUSINESS (2016) ("all litigation is emotionally
draining").
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take a significant amount of time, even if the dispute is never officially
litigated.' 23 For example, in opposing the "Mush for a Cure" trademark
application at the USPTO, the Komen Foundation filed two separate
extensions of time to oppose the application, until finally withdrawing
the opposition six months later. 2 4 During this time, the "Mush for a
Cure" founders had to live with the uncertainty of this legal dispute
25
Larger
while attempting to continue to plan for their annual event.'
organizations typically have general counsel and possibly other legal
26
staff members who assist with trademark enforcement matters.1
Having professionals handle legal disputes lessens the non-legal costs
involved, and although the disputes are still time-consuming, it is an
anticipated non-legal cost. By contrast, many smaller charitable
organizations are volunteer-based, meaning that any legal help they
receive would likely be found outside of the organization, either through
27
finding pro bono or low-cost legal help.1 For organizations like "Mush
for a Cure," the founder typically bears the brunt of the non-legal and
legal costs.1 28
Finally, there are increased costs to society stemming from
trademark bullying. Where abusive enforcement of legal rights reaches
the judicial system, increased costs come in the form of greater
29
expenditures on legal fees, as well as larger court dockets.1 Even where
123.

For a litigated civil case, the time to resolution may be one to two years. See Grinvald,

Policing, supra note 19, at 428 (citing to an empirical study of federal courts).
124. See Interview by WTIP's Jay Andersen with "Mush For A Cure" organizers Mary Black
and Sue Prom (Jan. 17, 2011, 1:22PM), http://www.wtip.org/content/mush-cure-may-face-bumpylegal-trail-future.

125.

See id.

See Cathleen Flahardy, Melissa Maleske, Mary Swanton & Larua Williamson, Five
126.
General Counsel Who Thrive in the Non-Profit World, INSIDECOUNSEL (July 1, 2010),
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2010/07/01/five-general-counsel-who-thrive-in-the-non-profit

(interviewing the general counsels of Habitat for Humanity and American Red Cross, among
others).

127. See Grinvald, Shaming, supra note 17, at 657 n.194 (citing various methods to find free
or low-cost legal help).
128. See interview, supra note 125 (Responding to the question of whether the legal battle
with the Komen Foundation has cost her organization any money, the co-founder Sue Prom
answered, "It hasn't cost us any yet. And we want to make sure, too, like, all or pledges that the
mushers receive got the National Breast Cancer Foundation. The money that we get from sponsors
or other donations are used to pay for the expenses. And if we decide, or if this costs any money, it's
not going to come from that. It will come out of my pocket, just because we're all fighting against
the same thing. We're fighting against breast cancer, not against each other or corporations. So, it
seems senseless to spend the money on it.").
Steven Shavell, The FundamentalDivergence Between the Private and the Social Motive
129.

to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575, 575 (1997) ("The legal system is a very costly
institution, absorbing substantial resources whether measured by the magnitude of legal
expenditures, the number of lawyers, or the sheer volume of litigation.").
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such abusive behavior stays outside of the courtroom, society faces costs
associated with private-error costs and subsidizing the bullying with its
donated funds. Private-error costs are those instances of trademark
enforcement where the alleged infringer has a perfectly legal right to
utilize the trademark it is using. However, instead of putting up a fight,
the targeted party settles the dispute in order to not expend the financial
resources outlined above. This in effect amounts to an error with ripple
effects, as trademark bullies often cite prior cases of quick compliance
by other targeted parties as a way to intimidate and gain future
compliance.130
Additionally, society faces costs due to what amounts to a
subsidization of trademark bullying with its donated funds. Some large
charitable organizations have been spending a not-inconsequential
percentage of their charitable donations on legal fees. For example, in
the midst of the Komen Foundation trademark bullying, it was revealed
that the organization had spent over one million dollars on legal fees in
one year alone. 13 1 Even though donors can restrict their funds to specific
purposes that the organization would be legally-bound to follow when
making their donations, it is unlikely that donors would think to restrict
their funds to non-legal matters. Therefore, it is likely that society as a
whole bears the burden of trademark bullying.
2. Reduction of Competition
At first blush, a reduction of the number of competing charitable
organizations may not seem like such a bad thing. After all, I have
pointed out earlier in this Article that there are almost one million
charitable organizations competing for a fairly fixed pot of public
donations.132 One's first instinct may be to think that a reduction in the
number of charities competing for donations may be beneficial because
larger, more established charities are better depositories for such
donations. However, this argument overlooks the essential role that
smaller charitable organizations play in providing complementary
services to larger organizations, as well as providing services at the local
level. 133
130. Alexander Zaitchik, The Village Bully One Voice Under God?, N.Y. PRESS (Apr. 29,
2003), http://www.nypress.com/print-article-7433-print.html (quoting from the Village Voice ceaseand-desist
trademark
131.
132.
133.

letter where the newspaper cited to past successes in obtaining compliance to its
enforcement demands).
See Bassett, supra note 10.
See McKeever, supra note 5, at 2.
Some organizations are extremely local. For example, after one Mississippi veteran had
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While there may be multiple charities competing in the same space,
oftentimes each charity focuses on a slightly different area and provides
complementary services to the public. For example, Women for
Wounded Warriors is focused on providing economic support to the
families of wounded veterans through mentorship and advocacy for
those seeking employment or a change in career paths. 13 4 By contrast,
the larger organization in the veterans' charitable organizations world,
Wounded Warriors Project, provides a wide range of support: physical,
emotional, economic, and networking services." It is clear from the
mission statements of the two organizations that, although they are both
concerned with assisting veterans, each does so in a slightly different but
complementary way.' 36 If smaller organizations such as Women for
Wounded Warriors were bullied out of existence, these types of
complementary or local services would likely cease to exist.137
In addition, smaller charitable organizations play a crucial role in
giving voice to less "sexy" causes or less visible societal concerns.138
This is due to the fact that larger charitable organizations typically have
a mission as to one particular area of concern, like children's diabetes,
heart disease, breast cancer, or wounded veterans' services. In having
one area of focus, other issues may not get the same level of attention by
the organization, or even by society. `9 For example, the Komen

four hip surgeries, volunteers with Wounded Warriors of Mississippi helped him build a ramp to his
house. See Lucy Dieckhaus, Mississippi Veterans Speak Out About the Wounded WarriorProject's

Lavish Spending, WJTVI2 (Mar. 11, 2016, 6:16pm), http://wjtv.com/2016/03/11/mississippiveterans-speak-out-about-the-wounded-warrior-projects-lavish-spending/.
134. About, WOMEN FOR WOUNDED WARRIORS, http://womenforwoundedwarriors.org/about/

(last visited Dec. 1, 2016).
135.

Programs,

WOUNDED

WARRIOR

PROJECT,

https://www.woundedwarriorproject.

org/programs (last visited Dec. 1, 2016).
136. Compare, WOMEN FOR WOUNDED WARRIORS, About, supra note 135, with WOUNDED
WARRIOR PROJECT, Programs,supra note 136.

137.

It has been posited by other commentators that public charities hold a special distinction

in the United States because they are heavily relied upon to provide services that the government

does not. In other countries where charitable donation giving by the public is much less, typically
the government provides the needed services. See Boris, supra note 74, at I ("Nonprofit
organizations were propelled into U.S. public consciousness during Reagan's budget cutbacks,
which were designed to dismantle inefficient and ineffective government social programs.
"Charities" were promoted as the nongovernmental saviors of the poor and of children, the elderly,

and the disabled.").
An example of this is AIDS prevention and treatment. See Boris, supra note 74, at 3.
138.
139. See Ashley JR Carter & Cecine N. Nguyen, A Comparison of Cancer Burden and
Research Spending Reveals Discrepancies in the Distribution of Research Funding, BMC PUB.

HEALTH (Jul. 17, 2012), http://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1471-2458-12526 (discussing the levels of research funding for various cancer diseases, as related to the societal
burden).
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Foundation has been extremely successful in raising awareness for
breast cancer, which is the number two cause of death for women in the
United States. 140 This increased awareness has seemingly led to an
increased funding for breast cancer, with recent statistics showing that
breast cancer research funding received approximately $699 million in
federal funding in 2016.141 When comparing breast cancer to prostate or
lung cancer, which each received $300 million and $400 million in
federal funding, respectively, one can see that there is likely a
correlation between the publicity a particular issue receives and its level
of funding. 14 2
Therefore, smaller organizations, like the Prostate Cancer
Foundation or the National Headache Foundation, serve an important
role in society, continuing to draw attention to the myriad concerns that
different members of society have. 143

H.

THE ROOTS OF OVER-ENFORCEMENT

Many scholars have written on the topic of trademark law
expansionism since the 1950s, including myself." In prior work, I
140.

See Elizabeth

Millard, In Raising Awareness For Women's Health, Is Pink

Overshadowing Red?, SELF (Oct. 24, 2016), http://www.self.com/story/breast-cancer-awareness-

heart-disease.
141. CategoricalSpending, NIH, https://report.nih.gov/categorical-spending.aspx (last visited
Dec. 4, 2016).
142. See Caroline May, Breast Cancer Receives Much More Research Funding, Publicity
Than Prostate Cancer Despite Similar Number of Victims, DAILY CALLER (Oct. 5, 2010, 2:51AM),
http://dailycaller.com/2010/10/05/breast-cancer-receives-much-more-research-funding-publicitythan-prostate-cancer-despite-similar-number-of-victims/. Even within the same organization, breast

cancer can receive more funding and attention. See id. (discussing the funding levels within the
American Cancer Society).
143. See Gardiner Harris, Medical Charities Once Advised on Coping With a Disease. Now
They Try to Cure It, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/06/

giving/medical-charities-once-advised-on-coping-with-a-disease-now-they-try-to-cure-it.html.

See

&

also PROSTATE CANCER FOUNDATION, https://www.pcf.org/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2016); NATIONAL
HEADACHE FOUNDATION, http://www.headaches.org/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2016).
144. See generally Lionel Bently, From Communication to Thing: HistoricalAspects of the
Conceptualisation of Trade Marks as Property, TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY, in TRADEMARK
LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH at 3 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie

Mark D. Janis eds., 2008); Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of TrademarkLaw, 82
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1840 (2007); Deven R. Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the
Genericism Conundrum, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1789, 1791 (2007); Robert G. Bone, Hunting
Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 548-49
(2006); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 369 (1999); Mark A.
Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1-3 (1999);
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi

Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 399 (1990); Lisa P. Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks
and the First Amendment, 70 TENN. L. REV. 1095, 1162 (2003); Jeremy N. Sheff, Marks, Morals,
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placed a large amount of the blame for trademark bullying in the forprofit sector on the legal system itself. I argue in this Part that changes to
the Lanham Act and the application of these changes by judges has led
to an environment of trademark over-enforcement. This background
information will provide context for the specific proposals I make in Part
III to attempt to curb charitable trademark bullies.
A.

Federal Trademark Law Expansionism

One of the roots of the over-enforcement problem has been the
expansion of federal trademark law.' 45 In fact, one could argue that
federal trademark law has been on an ever-expanding track since the
passage of the Lanham Act in 1945. For our purposes, there have been at
least three forms of expansion that directly relate to over-enforcement:
(1) an elimination of the distinction between a "trademark" and a "trade
name;" (2) an expansion in what is considered to "likely confuse"
consumers; and (3) an expansion in trademark-able subject matter. I will
discuss each in turn.
1. Elimination of the "Trademark" and "Trade Name" Distinction
Prior to the passage of the Lanham Act in 1945, an important
distinction in trademark and unfair competition law was the separation
between "technical trademarks" and "trade names." 46 To qualify as the
former, the mark had to be fanciful, arbitrary, or suggestive. Only
and Markets, 65 STAN. L. REV. 761 (2013); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and
Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777 (2004); Barton Beebe, Intellectual

Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. L. REV. 809, 832 (2010); Kenneth L. Port, The
Congressional Expansion of American Trademark Law: A Civil Law System in the Making, 35

WAKE FOREST L. REv. 827, 896 (2000); Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The PublicInterest
in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1722 (1999); Michael S. Mireles, Jr., Towards
Recognizing and Reconciling the Multiplicity of Values and Interests in TrademarkLaw, 44 IND. L.

REV. 427 (2011); Michael S. Grynberg, Trademark Litigation as Consumer Conflict, 83 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 60 (2008); Jessica M. Kiser, Brands as Copyright, 61 VILL. L. REv. 45 (2016); Deborah R.
Gerhardt, Consumer Investment in Trademark, 88 N.C. L. REV. 427 (2010); Sonia K. Katyal,
Stealth Marketing and Antibranding: The Love That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 58 BUFF. L. REV.

795 (2010); James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116
YALE L.J. 882 (2007); Greg Lastowka, Google's Law, 73 BROOK. L. REv. 1327, 1366-90 (2008);
William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. 49 (2008); Rebecca
Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86 TEx. L. REV. 507
(2008); Eric Goldman, DeregulatingRelevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 507

(2005); Grinvald, Shaming, supra note 17.
145. See Grinvald, Shaming, supra note 17, at 632.
146. Milton Handler & Charles Pickett, Trade-Marks and Trade Names-An Analysis and
Synthesis: I, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 168, 168 (1930); J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 4:4 (4th ed. 2010).
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technical trademarks could be federally registered. Trade names were all
other types of marks, including personal names and names of entities. 147
This distinction had a direct impact on charitable organizations because
the mark they typically used to fundraise for public donations was the
organization's name. 148 When a charitable organization wanted to
enforce against an alleged infringer, the organization needed to bring an
action based on unfair competition law, not trademark law. 149 The reason
this was significant was that the burden of proof in an action for unfair
competition law was much higher, oftentimes requiring the plaintiff to
prove intent to confuse or mislead the public.ISO In addition, some courts
required actual harm to have been suffered, and in the case of charitable
organizations, proof that actual confusion as to the organizations be
present. 15 ' By contrast, a plaintiff in a trademark lawsuit had a much
lower burden: not having to prove intent or actual confusion, just the
likelihood that consumers would be confused.' 5 2
Further, the remedies available under the two causes of action were
significantly different; while a prevailing plaintiff in both types of
actions could obtain an injunction of the defendant's behavior, an
injunction under an unfair competition lawsuit could be much
narrower."' Typically, even where a plaintiff could prove that the
147.
148.
149.

MCCARTHY, supra note 147, at § 4:5.
For example, the Red Cross, Salvation Army, etc.
Handler & Pickett, supra note 147, at 168.

150. See FRANK 1. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING TO
TRADE-MARKS 161 (1925).

151. See, e.g., Colonial Dames of Am. v. Colonial Dames of State of N.Y., 29 Misc. 10, 12, 60
N.Y.S. 302, 304 (Sup. Ct. 1899), afjJd, 63 A.D. 615, 71 N.Y.S. 1134 (App. Div. 1901), affid sub
nom. Colonial Dames of Am. v. Colonial Dames of the State of N.Y., 173 N.Y. 586, 65 N.E. 1115
(1902) ("Another important consideration telling in favor of the defendants is found in the fact that
there is no proof that any one has ever joined either of them in mistake for the plaintiff, or has been
.

otherwise deceived or seriously confused as to the identity of the three societies . .

152.
153.

See Schechter, supra note 151, at 161.
Handler & Pickett, supra note 147, at 169. One of the reasons for this difference lies in

the historical boundaries of the subject matter of technical trademarks and trade names. Technical
trademarks were either fictional terms, created by the entity for the purposes of selling its goods, or
an existing term arbitrarily used. MCCARTHY, supra note 147, at §4:4. Owning a technical
trademark gave exclusive control over the use of the term with respect to the owner's products. See

G.W. Cole Co. v. Am. Cement & Oil Co., 130 F.703, 705 (7th Cir. 1904). This meant that a
defendant likely did not have a reason for selling the same good as the plaintiff using the same or
very similar trademark, and so if the similarities between the two marks was likely to cause
confusion, there was infringement. See id. By contrast, trade names were those that were descriptive
of the goods or a person's name (MCCARTHY, supra note 147, at §4:5), which meant that a

defendant would likely have a non-infringing reason for using the trade name (for example, if the
defendant's name was the same as the plaintiffs). Where a plaintiff could prove trademark
infringement, the typical remedy was a complete and permanent injunction against the use of the

trademark. See Handler & Pickett, supra note 147, at 161. Typically, courts would deem such
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defendant had infringed on plaintiffs rights in an unfair competition
lawsuit, the judge would craft a narrow injunction to allow the defendant
to continue to operate while not infringing. 15 4 In trademark lawsuits,
courts would routinely grant blanket injunctions to enjoin defendants
from using the plaintiffs trademark, regardless of whether it would put
the defendant out of business. 5 5
Although the strict distinction between trademarks and trade names
was fading by the 1920s and 1930s, with courts providing similar forms
of protection to both types of marks, the passage of the Lanham Act in
1946 officially ended the distinction.15 6 The Lanham Act not only ended
the distinction between types of marks, but it also specifically allowed
trade names to be federally registered upon a showing of "acquired
distinctiveness."'"' This was an important boon to trade names (and
therefore, to charitable organizations) because a federal trademark
registration carries with it some important evidentiary benefits, such as
validity of mark and proof of ownership.' Furthermore, federal
registration provides the registered trademark with national rights,
regardless of whether the trademark has actually been used in a
particular area.15 This has a direct impact on charitable organizations
because, while many start out as local volunteer groups, some of the
organizations may grow into a bigger entity with a larger geographical
reach.1 60 While an organization could still enforce its trademark rights in
its name without a federal registration, the scope of protection would be
limited to the geographical area of actual use and the burden of proof

infringement has "fraudulent," but without looking to the defendant's intent as technical trademark
infringement was a "no fault" tort. See MCCARTHY, supra note 147, at §30:1. But the remedy for a
case of proven trade name infringement was more nuanced, because there were real reasons for
allowing a defendant to continue to use the trade name. In these cases, courts crafted injunctions
that allowed the defendant to continue to operate its business without unfairly competing with the

plaintiff.
154. See, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
155.

See Handler & Pickett, supra note 147, at 169.

156. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2006), with Trade-Mark Act of 1905, Pub. L. No. 58-84, §
5(b), 33 Stat. 724, 725-26.
157. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2006). The 1905 Act allowed trade names to be registered only if
they had been in constant use from 1895 or earlier. Trade-Mark Act of 1905, Pub. L. No. 58-84, §
5(b), 33 Stat. 724, 725-26.
158. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (2006).
159. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (2006).
For example, the American Diabetes Association was founded in 1940 as a professional
160.
organization of doctors, and in 2015, the organization was a major national organization with over
2015 ANNUAL REPORT 3,
DIABETES ASSOCIATION,
750 staff members. AMERICAN
http://main.diabetes.org/dorg/PDFs/Financial/2015-american-diabetes-association-annualreport.pdf.
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would be higher.' 61 Therefore, the ability to register one's charitable
trademark is an important benefit, something that the American Diabetes
Association learned after going through trademark litigation. 162
While I am not advocating that trade names should not be federally
registered or recognized as trademarks, I do believe that the elimination
of the distinction between the two has given charitable organizations the
ability to be more aggressive in enforcing its marks. Combined with the
expansion of actionable confusion and trademark-able subject matter,
the groundwork has been laid for charitable trademark bullies.
2. Actionable Confusion
The second form of expansion in federal trademark law has been
with respect to the confusion standard. The traditional standard for
trademark infringement has been whether there is a "likelihood of
confusion" among consumers between the plaintiffs mark and the
defendant's.' 6 3 The pertinent question is, what exactly do consumers
need to be confused about? Traditional trademark law (as well as the
original Lanham Act) had required that this likely confusion be related
to the source of the plaintiffs products. " In this sense, in order for
there to be trademark infringement, a plaintiff would need to prove that
their consumers would likely think that they were purchasing plaintiffs
products when in reality they were purchasing defendant's products
instead.' 5 However, amendments to the Lanham Act in 1962 eliminated

161. See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 416 (1916) ("But this is not to
say that the proprietor of a trademark, good in the markets where it has been employed, can
monopolize markets that his trade has never reached, and where the mark signifies not his goods,
but those of another."); Am. Diabetes Ass'n, Inc. v. Nat'l Diabetes Ass'n, 533 F. Supp. 16, 19 (E.D.
Pa. 1981), aff'd sub nom. Am. Diabetes Ass'n, Inc. v. Nat'l Diabetes Ass'n, 681 F.2d 804 (3d Cir.
1982) ("The designation American Diabetes Association is not a formally registered mark, nor is it
inherently distinctive. Therefore, plaintiffs are required to prove that the mark can be protected and
that it has achieved a secondary meaning.").
162. While the American Diabetes Association won its case against the National Diabetes
Association, it apparently decided that it was more prudent to register their trademark. The
organization filed its lawsuit against the National Diabetes Association and the day before the court
hearing on its preliminary injunction, the American Diabetes Association filed its application to
register its mark with the USPTO.
163. See, e.g., Thomson v. Winchester, 36 Mass. (16 Pick.) 214, 216 (Mass. 1837).
164. See, e.g., Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 F. 407, 410 (2d Cir. 1917)
(holding that the defendant's use of the mark "AUNT JEMIMA" for pancake syrup would likely
confuse consumers that they were purchasing a product made by the makers of the pancake batter).
165. See id. ("Syrup and flour are both food products, and food products commonly used
together. Obviously the public, or a large part of it, seeing this trade-mark on a syrup, would
conclude that it was made by the complainant.").
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this restriction. 16 6 Thereafter, courts routinely began to apply the
likelihood of confusion standard to all types of confusion, including
association, sponsorship, or affiliation.' 67 These types of confusion are
less burdensome to prove because, as Professors Mark Lemley and Mark
McKenna correctly note, "'sponsorship' or 'affiliation' could refer to
virtually any relationship between the parties . . . ."68
This expansion of the forms of actionable confusion lays the
groundwork for charitable trademark bullying because it allows
charitable organizations to argue that they need to protect their
trademark against any uses that may hint of a connection with them. For
example, the Komen Foundation has used the fact that confusion can be
about association to justify their enforcement strategy. As the prior
general counsel of the Komen Foundation, referring to their "For the
Cure" trademark, stated "'If you look at our affiliates' websites, it can be
anything from 'baseball for the Cure,' 'lawyers for the cure,' 'volley for
the Cure,' 'golf for the cure'-you name it, we've got all sorts of events
associated with it."' 69 Therefore, this association warranted contacting
any entity that used "for the Cure" in the title of their organization or
event and "work[ing] with them to find a suitable arrangement."l 70
3. Ever-Expanding Trademark-able Subject Matter
While the U.S. has always taken an expansive view as to what can
constitute a trademark,171 prior to the 1990s, there were still some
limitations on what could be trademarked. 172 In particular, color was
initially held to not be subject to trademark protection. 173 However,
166.

The amendments in 1962 deleted the requirement that confusion be of "purchasers as to

the source of origin of such goods or services." MCCARTHY, supra note 147,

Oct. 9, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-772,

§

§ 5:6; see also Act

of

2, 76 Stat. 769, 769. Although, as pointed out by Professors

Lemley and McKenna, courts were already expanding the types of confusion before the 1962
Lanham Act amendments. See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 23, at 425-26.

167.

See, e.g., Armstrong Cork Co. v. World Carpets, Inc., 597 F.2d 496, 501 n. 6 (5th Cir.

1979) ("Under the Lanham Act, as amended, however, Congress adopted an open-ended concept of
confusion. Any kind of confusion will now support an action for trademark infringement.").

168.

Lemley & McKenna, supra note 23, at 427.

169.
Rosenthal, supra note 12 (quoting Mr. Blum, the then-general counsel of the Komen
Foundation).

170. Id.
171. McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 254 (1877) (describing the trademark-able subject
matter as any mark that "'consist[s] of a name, symbol, figure, letter, form, or device').
172.

MCCARTHY, supra note 147, at

§ 7:41.

173. See, e.g., A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., 201 U.S. 166,
171 (1906) ("[A] trade-mark which may be infringed by a streak of any color, however applied, is
manifestly too broad."); James Heddon's Sons v. Millsite Steel & Wire Works, Inc., 128 F.2d 6, 9
(6th Cir. 1942) ("Color, except in connection with some definite, arbitrary symbol or in association
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unlike the prior forms of expansion, amendments to the Lanham Act
were not the primary cause of the expansion of trademark-able subject
matter, but rather a U.S. Supreme Court case. 74 In Qualitex v.
Jacobson,175 the Supreme Court resolved a decades-long split among the
federal circuit courts as to whether color could serve as a trademark.17 6
Qualitex officially changed all of this by interpreting the language
of the Lanham Act to be limitless in defining what a trademark could be:
"Both the language of the Act and the basic underlying principles of
trademark law would seem to include color within the universe of things
that can qualify as a trademark. The language of the Lanham Act
describes that universe in the broadest of terms." 77 The only limitation
on what could serve as a trademark was the level of distinctiveness
needed to prove that the "word, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof' is acting like a trademark from the perspective of
the consuming public.' 7 For color and other types of "non-traditional"
marks, the trademark must be shown to have "secondary meaning," or a
level of recognition by consumers that the color is serving as a
trademark and not just decoration.7 9 For example, in Qualitex, the
dispute was over the use of a green-gold color for dry cleaning pads. The
plaintiff, Qualitex, argued that it used the color as a trademark and had
been doing so for over forty years. It further argued that customers had
come to associate this particular color with Qualitex's dry cleaning
pads.' 8 0

Expansion of trademark-able subject matter alone is not necessarily
cause for concern. There are a number of good reasons to allow
protection for non-traditional marks such as color, including that for
non-native English speakers, color and other types of non-traditional
marks assist them in finding the products for which they are searching.
In the Qualitex case, for example, the dry-cleaning business was the
target industry for Qualitex's green-gold pads. In the 1990s, the drycleaning businesses in many states (including in Qualitex's home city of
with some characteristics which serve to distinguish the article as made or sold by a particular
person is not subject to trademark monopoly.").

174. See Qualitex v. Jacobson, 514 U.S. 159 (1995).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 161-62 ("The Courts of Appeals have differed as to whether or not the law
recognizes the use of color alone as a trademark.").
177. Id. at 162.
178. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (definition of a trademark and definition of trademark use: "to
identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or
sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown").

179.
180.

See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992).
Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 162.
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Chicago) were run by Korean immigrants, a population for which
English was not their first language."' The ability to utilize color as a
way to know which dry cleaning pads to order is helpful, and the only
way to ensure that the dry cleaner is ordering the particular brand of
pads is to protect the color of the source identifier.
However, the expansion of trademark-able subject matter did not
occur inside a vacuum, and when combined with the other two forms of
expansion described in this Part, it has produced an environment that is
ripe for charitable trademark bullying. This appears to be the case
particularly where nonverbal marks are used, like color or images. For
example, in demanding that smaller charitable organizations stop using
"for the cure," the Komen Foundation had also requested them to stop
using the color pink, so as to avoid an appearance of association.
However, it is likely that pink has become generic as a mark for a breast
cancer organization; as in the United States, color has been used to
identify awareness of certain types of causes, most particularly diseases,
like breast cancer (pink), cancer (yellow or purple), AIDS/HIV (red),
depression (green), and autism (multicolored).' 82 But with the backdrop
of the three forms of expansion of trademark law, the Komen
Foundation has the ability to claim in a cease-and-desist letter that the
use of pink causes confusion by association. Combined with the judicial
application of expanded trademark law, the environment is ripe for
trademark bullying. As one lawyer sums it up, "The days are probably
anybody
over when nonprofits just said, 'We'll just get along with
83
here.""l
good
do
to
trying
all
we're
who's a nonprofit because
B.

Shifting Court Sentiment

Although the developments in the expansion of trademark law have
been percolating in the legal system for the last seventy years, it appears
that charitable trademark bullying (along with trademark bullying in the
for-profit sector) only started to gain momentum in the late 2000s.184
One of the non-legal reasons for this may be the economic depression
suffered in the United States beginning in 2008, which greatly impacted

See Murray Dubin, Koreans a Force in Dry Cleaning, PHJLLY.COM (Aug. 5, 1990) (on
181.
file with author).
182.
See Ian Langtree, Awareness Bracelets: Colors, Causes & Meanings, Disabled World,
DISABLED-WORLD.COM (May 25, 2010), https://www.disabled-world.com/disability/awareness/
awareness-bracelets.php.
183. See Marks, supra note 10 (quoting a trademark attorney).
See, e.g., supra notes 10 & 12.
184.
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charitable donations.ss This in turn could be seen as a reason for
charitable organizations to turn to branding and trademarks to help them
become more competitive in order to increase public donations.18 6
However, one legal reason for the increase in charitable trademark
bullying since the late 2000s may be a shift in judicial sentiment. I argue
in this part that there has been a shift in the way judges apply trademark
doctrines to charitable organizations. In the first half of the twentieth
century, judges appeared to be more sympathetic to smaller
organizations, with a view that all organizations are attempting to do
good for society. 1 7 By the late 1990s and 2000s, judges appeared to
have become more sympathetic to larger charitable organizations, but at
the same time, expected that these organizations would enforce their
trademarks just like for-profit corporations.'8
1. The Early Days-All Charities Do Good
As mentioned earlier, charitable organizations are not entirely
newcomers to trademark disputes. There are a number of litigated
disputes from the late 1800s and early 1900s,' 89 and there are likely a
large number of non-litigated disputes of which there are no surviving
records. Many litigated cases involve the use of similar names for
organizations with similar missions. For example, in Southern Medical
College v. Thompson, both organizations were dental schools using the
same name "Southern Dental College."' 9 0 In these types of cases, the
courts appeared to be sympathetic to both sides of the dispute, and in
applying theories of unfair competition, examined the case for intent to
defraud on the defendant's part.19' Where there was no such intent, the
courts were sympathetic to the defendant's use of a similar name due to
the charitable work that they undertook. For example, in Colonial
Dames of America v. Colonial Dames of State of New York, the court
stated,
185. See Phillip Swarts, CharitiesStill Feel Squeeze From Recession as Shrinking Donations
Fail to Meet Demand, WASH. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/
news/2014/apr/7/charities-still-feel-squeeze-from-recession-as-shr/.
186. See supra note 6.

187.
188.

See infra Part II.BI.
See infra Part II.B.2.

189.

See supra note 66.

190. Southern Medical College v. Thompson, 92 Ga. 564, 18 S.E. 430 (Ga. 1893).
191. Or, as in the case of International Committee Young Women's Christian Ass'ns v. Young
Women's Christian Ass'n of Chicago, 194 Ill. 194, 62 N.E. 551 (1901), where the majority decided
the case without finding an intent to defraud, the dissent reminded the majority that such an intent

was required by precedent. Id. at 554.
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At the outset it should be noted that this case is unique, in that none of
the parties is engaged in any business, in the sense of seeking financial
gain. On the contrary, all are equally seeking to accomplish patriotic
and unselfish ends. It is therefore obvious that the rules governing the
right to trade-marks and trade-names, evolved, as those rules have
been, from selfish attempts on the part of one person to appropriate for
his financial benefit what rightfully belongs to another, and decisions
of courts in thwarting such attempts, do not apply to such a case as
this, or, at any rate, ought not to be applied with the same strictness. 192
Similar cases are found until the late 1960s, where some courts still
appeared hesitant to apply trademark rules strictly in charitable
organization disputes and continued to require proof of deception (actual
intent or unintentional) on the part of defendants. For example, in the
case of Board of Provincial Elders of Southern Province of Moravian
Church v. Jones,193 the court denied a request for a preliminary
injunction against the defendants and required some type of deceit to be
shown. The North Carolina Supreme Court stated, "It may not be amiss
in such a situation to bear in mind the advice of a great lawyer of long
ago to an established religious body, concerned lest it be injured by the
activities of a small group of former associates: 'Refrain from these men,
94
and let them alone False"l
In addition, in applying trademark defenses such as abandonment or
laches to infringement disputes, courts appeared to err on the side of
preserving a charitable organization's trademark. For example, in
Missouri Federation of the Blind v. National Federationof the Blind of
Missouri, Inc., 1' the dispute was over the use of the term "Federation of
the Blind." Missouri Federation of the Blind, although technically the
plaintiff in the case, was in fact the junior organization and faced a
counterclaim of infringement by the National Federation of the Blind.
The plaintiff asserted a defense of laches, abandonment, or
acquiescence, and the court analyzed the legal consequences of each of
the defenses.' 96 Although there appeared to be grounds to find

192. Colonial Dames of Am. v. Colonial Dames of State of N.Y., 29 Misc. 10, 11, 60 N.Y.S.
302, 303 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1899), affd, 63 A.D. 615,71 N.Y.S. 1134 (N.Y. App. Div. 1901), affd sub
nom. Colonial Dames of Am. v. Colonial Dames of the State of N.Y., 173 N.Y. 586, 65 N.E. 1115
(N.Y. 1902).
193. Board of Provincial Elders, 273 N.C. 174, 159 S.E.2d 545 (1968).
194. Id. at 552.
195. Mo. Fed'n of the Blind v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of Mo., Inc., 505 S.W.2d I (Mo. Ct.
App. 1973).
196. Id.
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abandonment, 19 7 the court found that the doctrine of laches was better
applied. In determining that the National Federation of the Blind's suit
against the Missouri Federation of the Blind was barred by laches, the
court simply did not allow the defendant-intervenor to enjoin the
plaintiff from using its name.198 What this ruling meant was that the
National Federation of the Blind retained its trademark, but it simply
could not enforce it against the Missouri Federation of the Blind. If the
court had found that the National Federation of the Blind had abandoned
its mark, then this would have prevented the National Federation of the
Blind from enforcing its mark in the future against any other
unauthorized users.' 99
2. More Recent Cases-Well-Established Charities Need Greater
Protection
This more tolerant approach to charitable organizations seemed to
end around the late 1980s, particularly with respect to cases where larger
charitable organizations sue smaller organizations for trademark
infringement. Judges acknowledge this approach in, for example,
Cancer Research Inst., Inc. v. Cancer Research Soc., Inc., where the
judge states in a footnote, "Interestingly, although there seems to be no
legal theory articulated to support the proposition, it appears that public
service or benefit entities are accorded greater protection by the courts in
cases like this one than are for profit business organizations." 2 0 This
same sentiment appears in at least two other different cases involving
nonprofit organizations.201 In Cancer Research Institute, the plaintiff
was a large, well-established organization with $3.5 million in annual
revenue and the defendant was a small, more recently established
organization with less than $300,000 in annual revenue.20 2 In the court's
opinion, the judge's regard for the plaintiff is apparent, as the judge
refers to the director of the Cancer Research Institute as "impressive"
and refers to the defendants as "amateurs, who seem to the Court to be
way over their respective heads."2 03

197.

At least on the part by the local society.

198.
199.

Mo. Fed'n of the Blind, 505 S.W.2d at 10.
See 15 U.S.C. §1064 (2006) (registered marks deemed to have been abandoned may be

cancelled).

200.
(S.D.N.Y.
201.
202.
203.

Cancer Research Inst., Inc. v. Cancer Research Soc'y, Inc., 694 F. Supp. 1051, 1056
1988).
Alzheimer's and Credit Counseling
CancerResearchinst., Inc., 694 F. Supp. at 1056.
Id.

0
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Judge Sweet in Alzheimer's Found. of Am., Inc. v. Alzheimer's
Disease & Related Disorders Ass'n, Inc. articulated a reason for the
greater protection given to charitable organizations: "A compelling
reason for the enhanced judicial protection of a charity's trademarks is
the public interest in ensuring their contributions to charitable
organizations are received by the correct charity." 2" This sentiment
appears to be slightly different from the one that appeared a century
earlier in Colonial Dames, discussed above, and which is also held by
judges in cases as late as 1953.205 In ColonialDames, Judge Bookstaver
stated,
Reasons which may be all-sufficient to induce a court to restrain a defendant from making money that a plaintiff is entitled to make may be
wholly inadequate to warrant such interference where it is a question
of doing good deeds. In such a case the public welfare will not be conserved by too great astuteness in recognizing the exclusive rights that
sometimes are accorded to priority. The work as well as the workers
should be considered, and chiefly considered; because it is more important that philanthropic work should be done than that any particular
person should have the gratification of doing it. 206
The consumer's interest in making sure their contributions are not
waylaid by other organizations, even though other organizations are
fighting the same fight, appears to take precedent over the larger goal of
bettering society. This is an interesting shift, and one that does not
necessarily reflect the view of the consuming public. For example, upon
learning that the Komen Foundation had spent almost one million
dollars in one year to pursue its trademark enforcement strategy for its
"for the Cure" mark, comedian Stephen Colbert satirically stated, "If
they don't own the phrase "for the Cure," then people might donate
money thinking it's going to an organization dedicated to curing cancer,
2 07
when instead it's wasted on organizations dedicated to curing cancer."

204. Alzheimer's Found. of Am., Inc. v. Alzheimer's Disease & Related Disorders Ass'n, 796
F. Supp. 2d 458, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)]
205. See N. Country Cmty. Hosp. v. N. Shore Hosp., 123 N.Y.S.2d 265, 267 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1953). Generally speaking, the courts will not intervene to restrain a charitable corporation unless
the names are strikingly similar.

206.
302, 304
Colonial
(1902).
207.

Colonial Dames of Am. v. Colonial Dames of State of N.Y., 29 Misc. 10, 13, 60 N.Y.S.
(Sup. Ct. 1899), aff'd, 63 A.D. 615, 71 N.Y.S. 1134 (App. Div. 1901), aff'd sub nom.
Dames of Am. v. Colonial Dames of the State of N.Y., 173 N.Y. 586, 65 N.E. 1115
See, for example, Stephen Colbert's satirical "Tip of the Hat, Wag of the Finger" to the

Komen Foundation for bullying smaller organizations that use "for the Cure". The Colbert Report:

Episode 7001 (Comedy Central television broadcast Jan. 3, 2011), http://www.cc.com/video-
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In addition to providing greater protection to charitable
organizations against smaller and newer charitable entities, courts appear
to be holding charitable organizations to fairly high standards of
trademark enforcement and quality assurance. An example of this is the
2010
FreecycleSunnyvale
v.
Freecycle
Network
case.
FreecycleSunnyvale (Sunnyvale) brought a declaratory judgment action
against The Freecycle Network asking the court to find that Sunnyvale
was not infringing on Freecycle Network's mark "Freecycle" because
the mark had been abandoned through the Freecycle Network's lack of
quality control.208 The Freecycle Network is a nonprofit organization
dedicated to "freecycling," which is recycling of an unwanted item by
donating it to another person instead of disposing of it in the trash.2 09 in
2003, the Freecycle Network oversaw local freecycling groups that were
established through Yahoo! Groups and in 2005 sent a cease-and-desist
letter to Sunnyvale requesting that it stop using the mark "Freecycle". 2 10
When Sunnyvale refused to comply with its request, Freecylce Network
had Yahoo! Groups shut down Sunnyvale's group.211
As a general matter, where abandonment through lack of quality
control, also known as naked licensing, has been alleged, a majority of
courts have had a "friendly attitude."2 12 in such cases, courts require that
the allegations of naked licensing be held to a "stringent standard"
before being proven true.213 This is because a court will hold a
trademark to be abandoned if it finds naked licensing, which equates to a
total loss of one's trademark.214 In addition, where a nonprofit
organization is faced with allegations of naked licensing, courts have
been more apt to find an "implied license" rather than a naked license.215
For example, where a nonprofit university was alleged to not have any
rights in its "Bucky Badger" trademark, the court found that there had
clips/7bO84t/the-colbert-report-tip-wag-susan-g-komen-foundation-spider-man-musical.
208. FreecycleSunnyvale v. Freecycle Network, 626 F.3d 509 (9th Cir. Cal. 2010).
209. Id. at 513.
210. Id. at 513-14.
211. Id. at 514.
212.

Irene Calboli, The Sunset of 'Quality Control' in Modern TrademarkLicensing, 57 AM.

U.L. REv. 341, 366 (2007).
213. Id. at 367 ("[C]ourts consistently affirmed that claimants of naked licenses 'face[d] a
stringent standard [of proof].")
214. See 15 U.S.C. § I 141c (Section 45 of the Lanham Act): Definition of abandonment. See
also Calboli, supra note 213, at 367.
215.
An implied license is a judicially-constructed contract that is intended to "track the intent
of the contracting parties for purposes of supplementing their agreement." Orit Fischman Afori,
Implied License: An Emerging New Standard in Copyright Law, 25 SANTA CLARA COMP. & HiGH
TECH. L.J. 275, 276 (2009).
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been an implied license between the university and sellers of the badger
items.2 1 6 In Freecycle, however, the court seems to break with this more
lenient take on naked licensing and brings the gavel down on Freecycle
Network, finding that Freecycle Network had abandoned its mark
through naked licensing.217
The consequence of Freecycle and the other cases that provide for
greater protection of trademarks to charitable organizations appears to
have been the creation of an environment where larger charitable
organizations believe they need to enforce their marks in a fashion
similar to that of a for-profit organization. Within this legal environment,
having built up a well-known and trusted charitable brand, these entities
(and their lawyers) are nervous that they may lose their mark if they do
not institute aggressive trademark enforcement strategies. We can see
this through the actions of some of the more well-known bullies such as
the Komen Foundation (its "for a Cure" enforcement), the Livestrong
Foundation (its "strong" enforcement), and WWP (its "Wounded
Warriors" and silhouette imagery enforcement).218 In addition,
statements made by some of the entities accused of trademark bullying
give insight into the angst these entities are likely facing: "trademarks
serve as a shortcut (positive or negative) for the public to judge the
quality of charitable services, the caliber of programs, and the credibility
of information provided. Policing your trademarks is not an option. It's
an affirmative, legal duty." 2 19 I propose a number of suggestions below
216. Univ. Book Store v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1385 (TTAB 1994). Although this is a Trademark Trial and Appeal Board case and not a federal
district or circuit court case, this case has been cited with approval by other cases. See Bunn-O-

Matic Corp. v. Bunn Coffee Serv., 88 F. Supp. 2d 914 (C.D. 1Il. 2000); Univ. of Kan. v. Sinks, 565
F. Supp. 2d 1216 (D. Kan. 2008); Bishops Bay Founders Grp., Inc. v. Bishops Bay Apartments,
LLC, 301 F. Supp. 2d 901 (W.D. Wis. 2003).
217. FreecycleSunnyvale v. Freecycle Network, 626 F.3d 509, 520 (9th Cir. Cal. 2010).
However, it could be argued that the Ninth Circuit simply took the less popular route of strictly
requiring actual control of the Freecycle trademark. See Calboli, supra note 213, at 367 ("[OJnly
occasionally has the lack of adequate control brought the judiciary to declare licenses void.").

218.

For a list of oppositions

involving the

Susan G.

Komen

Foundation,

see

For a list of
http://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/v?qt-adv&procstatus=All&pn=susan+g.+komen.
see
http://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/
Livestrong Foundation,
oppositions involving the
v?qt-adv&procstatus=All&pn=livestrong. For a list of oppositions involving the WWP, see

http://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/vqt-adv&procstatus=All&pn=WOUNDED+WARRIOR+PROJE
CT.
219. Abby V. Reiner, Nonprofit Brand Tinted with -not Tainted by - Legal, DUETSBLOG (Jul.
22, 2014), http://www.duetsblog.com/2014/07/articles/trademarks/nonprofit-brand-tinted-with-not-

tainted-by-legal (Ms. Reiner is the Brand Director for WWP, Inc.). Earlier in the piece, Ms. Reiner
does acknowledge that "chasing down every unauthorized trademark use is time-consuming,
expensive, and ultimately counterproductive. There is an inherently increased risk factor to
nonprofits conducting the same monitoring and enforcement activities as for-profits due to the

852

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[50:817

that could help change the legal environment for charitable organizations
and hopefully dampen the potential angst of having to be over-vigilant
with one's marks.
III. SUGGESTIONS TO TAME THE BULLIES

I am not the first person to suggest that changes need to be made in
order to accommodate charitable organizations.220 Other commentators
have proposed suggestions made with an eye towards providing greater
protection to charitable organizations through amendments to the
Lanham Act and through expansions in doctrine, such as eliminating the
commercial requirement before applying the initial interest doctrine. 22 1I
am, however, one of the first to suggest changes that would serve to limit
how trademark doctrine applies to charitable organizations.2 22
In this Part, I look at disputes in both the judicial context (where a
dispute has reached the litigation stage) and the nonjudicial context
(where a dispute remains outside the sphere of the courtroom). I note
that it is likely that only a small percentage of disputes among charitable
organizations actually reach the litigation stage and therefore my
suggestions in the judicial context may not be directly helpful. 223
Nevertheless, the reason changes need to be made in the judicial context
is two-fold: first, if judges make it harder for charitable trademark
bullies to plead trademark infringement, then an early dismissal of a
lawsuit may occur more frequently,2 24 and second, tougher pleading
nature by which nonprofits are 'judged."' However, Ms. Reiner does not provide any guidelines for
what WWP, Inc. would view as an unauthorized trademark use that they would not enforce against.
220. See Lauren Behr, Note, Trademarksjbr the Cure: Why Nonprofits Need Their Own Set of
Trademark Rules, 54 B.C. L. REV. 243 (2013); Christopher T. Ward, Who's Afraid of the Big,
FriendlyNonprofit?Saber Rattling and the Sad State ofAffairs for Small CharitableNonprofits and
TrademarkLaw, 11 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 295 (2011); Richard D. Salgado, Piracyand
Chaos in the Marketplace of Ideas: Why Money Cannot Be Everything When Assessing InitialInterest Confusion and Nonprofit Trademark Holders, 61 ARK. L. REV. 241 (2008).
221. See generally Behr, supra note 221 (amendments to Lanham Act); Salgado, supra note
221 (eliminating commerciality as requirement in initial interest confusion arguments).
222. See Ward, supra note 221, at 323-25 (proposing a number of changes to clarify trademark
law with an eye towards assisting smaller charitable organizations).
223. Only a small percentage of all intellectual property-related disputes actually reach the
litigation stage, and so by corollary, only a small percentage of all disputes among charitable
organizations would do the same. See William M. Landes, An Empirical Analysis of Intellectual
Property Litigation: Some PreliminaryResults, 41 HOUS. L. REv. 749, 761 (2004) (relating that
only three percent of all legal disputes are brought to the courthouse).
224. Although another method of obtaining an early dismissal of a lawsuit is through the use
of a state's anti-SLAPP law, not all states have them enacted. See Rebecca Schoff Curtin, SLAPPing
Patent Trolls: What Anti-Trolling Legislation Can Learnfrom the Anti-SLAPP Movement, 18 STAN.
TECH L. REV. 39, 45 (2014) ("Anti-SLAPP laws have provided states with a wealth of experience in

2016]

CHARITABLE TRADEMARKS

853

standards may have an indirect effect on deterring cases that cannot meet
the higher standards.22 5
A.

HeightenedPleadingRequirements

Many scholars have written about pleading standards, particularly
after the Supreme Court's decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly
and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, both of which arguably served to heighten the
pleading standards in federal civil litigation.2 26 "Twiqbal," as the two
cases are commonly referred to together,227 did this by requiring that the
plaintiffs complaint include facts that provide "plausibility" to the
alleged wrongdoings, and not simply a "belief." 228 As a result, many
scholars have bemoaned the "significant hurdles" that the Supreme
Court's decisions have placed in the way of bringing civil lawsuits. 22 9
The issue in the trademark realm, however, is that where a charitable
trademark bully has a registered trademark, this can potentially provide
the factual plausibility for a trademark infringement action.230 This
the use of particular tools to deter and deal with nuisance suits, such as an expedited motion to
dismiss with a stay of discovery."); Marc J. Randazza, The Need for a Unified and Cohesive
National Anti-SLAPP Law, 91 OR. L. REV. 627, 628 (2012) (arguing for a unified anti-SLAPP law
because of the disparity between states that have strong anti-SLAPP laws, weak laws, and no laws
at all); Eric Goldman, We Need FederalAnti-SLAPP Legislation, But Sen. Kyl's "FreePress Act of

AM),
11:52
2012,
24,
(Sept.
FORBES
(Yet),
Answer
the
2012" Isn't
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2012/09/24/we-need-federal-anti-slapp-legislation-butsen-kyls-free-press-act-of-2012%E2%80%B3-isnt-the-answer-yet/#llc2b9Iab22b.
225. This would have an effect on those bullies operating in the "shadow of the law." See
generally William T. Gallagher, Trademark and Copyright Enforcement in the Shadow of IP Law,
28 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 453 (2012).

226. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. lqbal, 556 U.S. 662
(2009). Compare Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 17 (2010) ("Given the dramatic changes and
sharp debate precipitated by Twombly and Iqbal, the Federal Rules - indeed, federal civil practice in
general - stand at a critical crossroads."), with Adam N. Steinman, The PleadingProblem, 62 STAN.

L. REV. 1293, 1299 (2010) ("This Article challenges the conventional wisdom that Iqbal and
Twombly run roughshod over a half-century's
standards.").

worth of accumulated wisdom on pleading

227. Christine P. Bartholomew, Twiqbal in Context, 65 J. L. ED. 744, 744 (2016).
228. A. Benjamin Spencer, PlausibilityPleading,49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 434 (2008).
229. See generally Kendall W. Hannon, Much Ado about Twombly - A Study on the Impact
of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811 (2008)
(providing an empirical study of the effect of Twombly and finding that the rate of dismissal in civil
rights cases spiked in the four months after Twombly was decided); Spencer, supra note 229

(arguing that the holding of Twombly is against the "original liberal ethos" of the American
litigation system).

230.

Robert T. Sherwin, #HaveWeReallyThoughtThisThrough?: Why Granting Trademark
&

Protection to Hashtags Is Unnecessary, Duplicative, and Downright Dangerous, 29 HARV. J. L.
TECH. 455, 491 (2016).
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would mean that even if the lawsuit was in fact based on an
unreasonable interpretation of the charitable organization's trademark, a
court may not discover this until the case proceeds further on past the
pleading stage.2 31
What this does is increase the probability that the charitable
trademark bully would succeed in their bullying, as smaller charitable
organizations would likely not have the resources to defend an extended
legal battle. Therefore, I suggest that judges should require factually
plausible allegations of either deceptive intent or source confusion (for
example, waylaid donations due to source confusion on the part of
donors).232 I argue that either could be required by judges because the
Lanham Act only specifies that the standard for trademark infringement
be a "likelihood of confusion. "233 Judges have been at the forefront of
interpreting this provision since its enactment, and therefore, there
should be little to bar judges from interpreting the statute to require one
of these additional pleading requirements.
1. Defendant's Deceptive Intent23 4
As discussed in Part II, historically, when charitable organizations
litigated disputes over their names, they typically had to litigate under a
theory of unfair competition, as their organization names were
considered trade names and not trademarks.235 Unfair competition
required the plaintiff prove that in adopting the plaintiffs name (or a
name very similar), the defendant's intent was to deceive the public and
pass themselves as the plaintiff.2 36 With the removal of the distinction
between trade names and trademarks, the requirement to prove deception
was also erased, with courts tending to infer deceit on the part of the
adoption of the same name or a very similar name.2 37 This has meant
231. FED.R.CIv.P. 12(a)(1)(A). At the very least, a complaint that states "a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face" would survive a motion to dismiss and require the defendant to file an
answer. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. See also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570).
232. This would be in addition to the other elements of a prima facie case of trademark
infringement. See MCCARTHY, supra note 147, at

233.

See 15 U.S.C.

§ 1125(a)

§ 34:1.

(Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act).

234.
1 focus in this section on the defendant's deceptive intent, rather than on defendant's
general intent in adopting and using the trademark at issue. As a technical matter, trademark
infringement (as opposed to unfair competition) cases do not consider the defendant's good faith
intent in whether the trademark at issue is infringing. See MCCARTHY, supra note 147, at §23:124

("A mistaken, good faith belief will not excuse otherwise illegal infringement.").
235.
236.

See Handler & Pickett, supra note 147.
See SCHECHTER supranote 151.

237.

See MCCARTHY, supra note 147, at

§ 23:105.

2016]

CHARITABLE TRADEMARKS

855

that plaintiffs bringing trademark infringement claims based on an
organization's name no longer have to plead deceptive intent on the part
of the defendants as part of a prima facie case. 23 8
In so doing, this has eased the burden on plaintiffs and can perhaps
partially explain the rise in trademark litigation undertaken by charitable
organizations. 239 While the consideration of bad-faith intent has not
disappeared from trademark infringement cases altogether, it is generally
considered at a later stage of the case. 240 Courts will consider evidence
of a defendant's bad faith when analyzing whether a defendant's use of
its trademark is likely to cause confusion with the plaintiff s. 24 1 In fact,
where the evidence is mixed on whether the defendant's actions would
likely cause confusion, courts have often held in favor of the plaintiff
where there was evidence of a bad-faith intent on the defendant's part.242
However, since consideration of this deceptive intent is undertaken with
an analysis of the merits of the case, this would mean that the lawsuit is
well under way at this point.243 To reiterate my earlier point, it is
unlikely that a smaller charitable organization could sustain a defense to
get to this point. Bringing back a deceptive intent requirement at the
pleading stage may serve to limit the number of cases that proceed past
pleadings. 2 4
I do recognize that there are a number of difficulties with requiring

238.

See Sunward Electronics, Inc. v. McDonald, 362 F.3d 17, *25, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d 2002 (2d

Cir. 2004) (holding that a wrongful intent is not a prerequisite in a Lanham Act case for trademark
infringement under § 32 or under § 43(a)).
See supra PartI.
239.

240.

It is typically considered as a factor in the multi-factor likelihood of confusion test, as

well as the damages stage. Where a defendant has acted in bad-faith, the defendant's profits may be

awarded to the plaintiff, along with other damages. See MCCARTHY, supra note 147, at § 23:111.
241. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) (listing the
likelihood of confusion factors: "[t]he prior owner's chance of success is a function of many
variables: the strength of his make, the degree of similarity between the two marks, the proximity of
the products, the likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap, actual confusion, and the
reciprocalof defendant's goodfaith in adopting its own mark, the quality of defendant's product,

and the sophistication of the buyers.") (emphasis added).
242.

See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark

Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REv. 1581, 1600 (2006).
243. See Mark Bartholomew, TrademarkMorality, 55 WM. & MARY L. REv. 85, 157 (2013)
("[E]ven if they lack evidence of the defendant's intent before filing suit, trademark holders are
incentivized to file and commit the defendant to expensive discovery proceedings in the hopes that

such evidence will appear.").
244. Other scholars, including Professors Bartholomew and McKenna and Bob Bone, have
proposed the use of some form of deceptive intent to be part of trademark infringement cases. See
id.; Mark P. McKenna, A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of Trademark Law, 98 VA. L. REV.

67, 113 (2012); Robert G. Bone, Taking the Confusion Out of "Likelihood Of Confusion ": Toward
a More Sensible Approach to TrademarkInfringement, 106 Nw. U. L. REv. 1307, 1350-53 (2012).
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plausible bad-faith intent to be included as a requirement in a plaintiffs
complaint. As a theoretical matter, some courts have held that the
defendant's intent is not the primary issue at stake in a trademark
infringement lawsuit-it is whether the consumers will be confused.2 4 5
In addition, some commentators have argued that intent should never be
considered in a trademark infringement lawsuit due to the need to be
consumer-focused.246
Requiring the defendant's bad-faith intent to be a part of a
plaintiff s prima facie case may move trademark law slightly away from
a consumer-focus, but many scholars have argued that this has already
happened with other doctrines such as dilution. 247 Therefore, as a
practical matter, I believe there is room for a bad-faith intent pleading
requirement in order to combat abusive trademark litigation. It would
seem that many courts may in fact welcome this requirement. I already
mentioned that courts are already using the existence of bad-faith intent
as a way to decide close cases. 248 Additionally, as noted by Professor
Bob Bone, courts use the defendant's bad-faith intent as a way to
moralize a finding of trademark infringement.2 49 My proposal would
245. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Overland, Inc., 692 F.2d 1250, 1265 n.16 (9th Cir. 1982)
("The basic policy behind the Lanham Act is to protect customers against likelihood of
confusion. ... Given this policy, the determination of liability focuses on the objective fact of likely
customer confusion and not on the subjective mental state of the infringer.").
246.
See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 147, at § 23:124 ("State of mind may be important
when it comes to fashioning the scope of injunctive relief and the award of monetary relief, but

should have little or no weight in determining liability in the first place."); Thomas L. Casagrande,
A Verdict for Your Thoughts? Why an accused Infringer's Intent Has No Place in Likelihood of

Confusion Analysis, 101 TRADEMARK REP. 1447 (2011) (proposing an elimination of intent as a
factor to be considered in determining trademark infringement). But see Bartholomew, supra note
244, at 158 ("the goal should not be to completely excise moral concerns from trademark law but to
bring them to the surface and subject them to further interrogation, just like any other technique of

legal argument"). My proposal would be similar to Professor Bartholomew's suggestion of openly
acknowledging moral decision-making.
247. See, e.g., Sandra L. Rierson, The Myth and Reality ofDilution, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV.
212, 212 (2012); Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108
YALE L.J. 1687, 1698 (1999) ("[D]ilution laws represent a fundamental shift in the nature of
trademark protection."). See also Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark

Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1839, 1845 (2007) (citing other types of trademark law doctrine that
scholars have criticized have gone beyond the consumer-focus).
248. See Beebe, supra 243, at 1600.
249.
Bone, supra note 245, at 1350-53. Like Professor Bone, I advocate for courts to use a
defendant's deceptive intent more "explicitly." Id. at 1353 ("The moral function of intentional

deception should be brought to the fore and explicitly factored into the construction of liability
rules. Doing so shows why the simple test is justified: a plaintiff should be able to enjoin use of a
mark by proving that the defendant adopted the mark with the intent to deceive consumers."). See
also generally Bartholomew, supra note 244 (arguing that judges use moral judgments to decide
cases of trademark infringement).
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simply shift such consideration of defendant's bad-faith intent to an
earlier stage of the litigation and allow courts to dismiss cases earlier.
Another valid concern is that placing an additional requirement on a
plaintiffs pleading will cause insurmountable hurdles, which may
discourage or limit trademark holders' abilities to bring litigation. 2 50 In
turn, this may then push such discouraged plaintiffs into resolving their
trademark infringement disputes extra-judicially, such as through ceaseand-desist letters. In response to this concern, I would argue that this has
already happened to some extent due to the high costs (both in time and
money) of litigation, as well as the high levels of uncertainty of
outcome. 25 1 Although some charitable organizations may feel
constrained in their policing efforts, it is important to recall that there are
a number of non-judicial avenues available to police against fraudulent
or misrepresentative entities, including the Federal Trade Commission,
the FBI, state Attorneys General, or even through shaming the rogue
entity. 212
2. Source Confusion
I am not the first scholar to argue for a limitation on trademark
infringement lawsuits through the use of a more narrowly-focused
confusion requirement. Many scholars before me have done so quite
eloquently, and I do not have the space to do all of them justice.253
Instead, I will focus on the formulation of an argument proposed by
Professors Mark Lemley and Mark McKenna.254 Professors Lemley and
McKenna posit that confusion, other than about source or matters related

250. This is a similar concern that has been raised in the more general debate regarding the
post-Twiqbal pleading rules. See supra note 230.
251. See generally, Grinvald, Policing, supranote 19.
252. See, e.g., Shawn Tully, Trump Investigations Now Multiplying, FORTUNE (Sept. 15,
2016), http://fortune.com/2016/09/14/trump-foundation-investigation-pam-bondi/ (reporting New
York State Attorney General's investigation into the Trump Foundation, a public charity); Mitch
Blacher, FBIInvestigates Charity Associated with DA Seth Williams, NBC10 PHILADELPHIA (Sept.

10, 2016), http://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/investigations/FBI-Investigates-Charity-Associatedwith-DA-Seth-WilliamsPhiladelphia-394344331.html (reporting that the FBI is investigating a
public charity associated with the Philadelphia District Attorney); Press Release, FTC, FTC, States
Settle Claims Against Two Entities Claiming to Be Cancer Charities; Orders Require Entities to Be
Dissolved and Ban Leaderfrom Workingfor Non-Profits, Mar. 30, 2016, https://www.ftc.gov/newsI
events/press-releases/2016/03/ftc-states-settle-claims-against-two-entities-claiming-be-cancer.

discuss shaming below in Part III.B.
253.

at 136.
254.

See, e.g., McGeveran & McKenna, supra note 23, at 301-06; McKenna, supra note 245,

Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413 (2010).
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to quality, is "irrelevant" and should not be part of trademark law.2 55
Instead, they argue that in trademark cases, including those cases where
consumers would be confused as to who is guaranteeing the quality of
the products at issue, courts should focus their attention on material
confusion. 2 56 All other types of confusion should be handled according
to false advertising law, which requires an element of materiality.2 57
I agree wholeheartedly with Professors Lemley and McKenna's
proposal and believe that courts should adopt it. Additionally, I would
argue that it should be required that a plaintiff plead this type of
confusion in its complaint or else the complaint should fail. Particularly
for charitable organizations, the complaint would need to plausibly
allege that the defendant's use of its trademark likely confuses donors
about the entity to whom they are donating. Time and again, courts have
stated that the harm in charitable organization trademark cases is
waylaid donations.258 This type of confusion is one about source, in that
donors should be able to rely on the trademark of the charitable
organization to be assured that their donation is going to the correct
source. Other types of confusion and confusion-related doctrines
(confusion regarding association or affiliation, and initial interest and
post-sale confusion) are just not relevant in these situations.25 9 This
requirement would serve to act as a gatekeeper, keeping litigation that is
not about source outside of the courthouse. In addition, the hope would
be that it would have the effect of limiting the types of trademark
infringement enforcement actions that are undertaken outside of the
courthouse. 260

255. Id. at 414.
256. Id. at 415.
257. Id. at 445-46.
258. See, e.g., Deborah Heart and Lung Ctr. v. Children of the World Found., Ltd., 99 F. Supp.
2d 481, 494 (D.N.J. 2000) ("the public also has a right to know to whom they are giving their
money and who is administering these services. . . . The consumers of these services should

likewise know which organization is treating them and which is not").
259. For more on other types of confusion, please see generally Jeremy Sheff, Veblen Brands,
96 MINN. L. REV. 769 (2012) (post-sale confusion); Zachary J. King, Knock-off My Mark, Get Set,
Go to Jail? The Improprieties of Criminalizing Post-Sale Conjitsion, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2220
(2012) (post-sale confusion); Eric Goldman, DeregulatingRelevancy in Internet Trademark Law,
54 EMORY L.J. 507 (2005) (initial interest confusion); Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest
Confusion: Standing at the Crossroadsof TrademarkLaw, 27 CAROOzo L. REV. 105 (2005) (initial
interest confusion).

260.

Although hard to quantify, more enforcement cases are handled extra-judicially through

informal enforcement processes, such as cease-and-desist letters. See Gallagher, supra note 226, at

481-82; Grinvald, Policing, supra note 19, at 412; Irna D. Manta, Bearing Down on Trademark
Bullies, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 853, 854-57 (2012).
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Shaming

In earlier work, I argue that responsible shaming of trademark
bullies can be an effective non-judicial method of defending oneself
against bullies. 261 Particularly when used on social media, I argue that
responsible shaming of trademark bullies could be a low-cost method of
defending a small business or individual from trademark bullying.26 2
Effective, responsible shaming allows for a small business or individual
to fight back and stop the bullying, oftentimes allowing the targeted
entity to obtain a reasonable settlement or to have the bully drop their
enforcement efforts altogether.263 I outline four conditions that are
needed for effective shaming: (1) the trademark bully is vulnerable to
shaming; (2) a community with shared norms exists; (3) the trademark
bully, its consumers, and the shamers are part of the same community;
and (4) the shamer is credible. 2 6 Not only are all of these conditions
typically present in the charitable organization context, but as I will
argue below, some of the conditions are amplified when they are applied
in such context.
1. Charitable Trademark Bullies are Vulnerable to Shaming
In the for-profit sector, one of the main problems with the
effectiveness of shaming is that some trademark bullies are
unshaneable.2 65 There are some large trademark holders that are
comfortable with being labeled a trademark bully, and further, they may
be seeking to attain that reputation because it enables them to more
effectively enforce their trademarks going forward. For example, many
unshameable trademark bullies will often cite to prior cases in their
cease-and-desist letters to intimidate the target into capitulating without
putting up a fight.266 One of the reasons that a large entity may be
immune to shaming is because they have a product or service for which

261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

Grinvald, Shaming, supra note 17.
Id. at 677.
Id. at 627 (relating the story of "VERMONSTER").
Id. at 666-67.
Id. at 672.
See, e.g., Alexander Zaitchik, The Village Bully One Voice Under God?, N.Y. PRESS

(Apr. 29, 2003), http://www.nypress.com/the-village-bully-one-voice-under-god/

(quoting cease-

and-desist letter: "We hope to resolve this matter amicably, and, if you respond promptly, are
willing to work with you in an effort to minimize any disruption to your company's business. Our
previous experience with the Bloomington Voice, Dayton Voice and Tacoma Voice newspapers . .
indicates that we can accomplish this goal").
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they believe there is no good substitute.2 67 In these situations, it is likely
that the large trademark holder believes that even if they gain a
reputation as a trademark bully, their consumers will likely not stop
purchasing their products.2 68
In the nonprofit sector, however, it is highly unlikely that any
charitable organization will be immune to shaming, as charitable
services are somewhat fungible.2 69 Charitable organizations, particularly
those that rely on public donations for a bulk of their funding, may be
particularly vulnerable to shaming because they are already relying on
the goodwill of the public to donate. A strong charitable brand is likely
strong because they have convinced the public to trust that the public's
donations are mainly going towards bettering society. Any hint of
wrongdoing and the public may donate elsewhere. In fact, recent
behavior by charitable organizations and donors proves this point. After
the media covered stories of the Komen Foundation's trademark
bullying, the Komen Foundation was shamed by a number of different
outlets, including former supporters of the Komen Foundation and the
comedian Stephen Colbert.2 70 Former donors of the Komen Foundation
stated that they would not donate anymore.27 1 Right after the shaming,
the Komen Foundation dropped almost all of its oppositions to those
smaller entities who were using "for a Cure."2 72 This suggests that
charitable organizations can be particularly vulnerable to responsible
shaming.

267.

2016),

See, e.g., Robert Garson, Are the Kardashians TrademarkBullies?, OBSERVER (Dec. 8,

http://observer.com/2016/12/are-the-kardashians-trademark-bullies/

(author opining

on

whether the Kardashians are trademark bullies); Drew Harwell, These College Students Took on

One of America's Top Trademark Bullies -

and Won, WASH. POST (Feb. 29, 2016),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2016/02/29/these-college-students-took-onone-of-americas-top-trademark-bullies-and-won/?utm term=.85aab3dad7lf (reporting on Monster

Energy's trademark bullying of Monsterfishkeepers.com).
268.
This could be the reason that Monster Energy continues to be a top trademark bully. See
Harwell, supra note 268.

269.

One could argue that all charitable organizations provide a fungible service in a way, as

all organizations are attempting to better society. However, even when examining charitable
organizations more granularly, there is overlap in a number of similar categories. See, e.g., Charity
Ratings, CHARITY WATCH, https://www.charitywatch.org/charities (click on "search for charity by

category").
270.
271.
272.

See supranote 208.
See Bassett, supra note 10 (quoting the founder of "Mush for a Cure").
See supranote 219 (showing that the date of the dropped oppositions was close in time to

when shaming took place).
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2. Communities and Shared Norms
Community and shared norms are two other conditions that are
amplified in the nonprofit arena. Many charitable organizations have
donors who are committed to an organization's cause due to a shared
characteristic or background. For example, many members of the
Juvenile Diabetes Research Foundation (JDRF) have juvenile diabetes or
a loved one with juvenile diabetes.273 In addition, these types of
charitable organizations work hard at building their communities
through their branding.274 These organizations host annual fundraisers,
hold year-round events like 5K road races, and sell bracelets or ribbons
to raise donations and build a community.275 When the Livestrong
Foundation began selling their yellow rubber bracelets that signify
support for those with cancer, it became an overnight sensation.27 6
Families and friends touched by cancer would wear these bracelets, and
wearing them while seeing others wearing them would make them feel
connected with a community. 277
Additionally, communities of large and small charitable
organizations often overlap, such that shaming the trademark bully
would be seen by members of both communities. For example, the
founders of "Mush for a Cure" would often donate to the Komen
Foundation personally even though the proceeds from their annual
fundraiser went to the National Cancer Society (however, after they
were themselves targeted by the Komen Foundation, they vowed to no
longer donate to them). 27 8
Further, these communities share norms of how they believe their
charitable organizations should behave. For example, when the founder
of Livestrong, Lance Armstrong, finally admitted that he had used
performance-enhancing drugs in order to outperform his competitors in

273.

See JDRF, www.jdrf.org (last visited Mar. 5, 2017).

274.

The same is certainly true in the for-profit sector. See Deborah R. Gerhardt, Social Media

Amplify Consumer Investment in Trademarks, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1491, 1509-10 (2012).
275. See generally Daniel Webber, Understanding Charity Fundraising Events, 9 INT' J.
NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR MARKETING 122
charitable fundraisers and potential motivations for holding
276. TIMOTHY KACHINSKE, 90 DAYS TO SUCCESS
Livestrong bracelets worn by Lance Armstrong on the

(2004) (discussing different types of
them).
IN FUNDRAISING 98 (2009) ("Yellow
Tour de France became an overnight

sensation and raised millions of dollars for his foundation.").
277.

See, e.g., Jonathan Agin, I Still Wear the Yellow Bracelet, HUFF. POST THE BLOG (Nov.

15, 2012, at 4:20PM),
b-b_2130306.html.
278.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jonathan-agin/i-still-wear-the-yellow-

See Bassett, supranote 10 (quoting the founder of "Mush for a Cure").
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the Tour de France, a majority of the community was devastated. 27 9 The
scandal caused Lance Armstrong to resign from his position as CEO of
the Livestrong Foundation.280 Some community members stopped
wearing the yellow bracelets but still supported Livestrong, while others
left the community altogether and vowed to no longer support the
organization.28 1 The same has happened with WWP, which has recently
undergone a scandal about how it spends its money. The founder and
CEO, as well as the COO, resigned. What has been interesting about the
WWP aftermath is that other charitable organizations that also fundraise
in order to assist wounded veterans have tried to ensure that the public
know they are not affiliated with WWP. This appears to be due to the
scandal and not because of WWP's trademark bullying efforts.2 82
However, it is important to responsible shaming that communities
not only share norms of how the organization should behave, but also
share the same legal norms.283 With trademark bullying, the legal norm
that has been violated is the unreasonable interpretation of trademark
rights by the bullier. Although it is likely that communities will react
negatively to shaming when larger charitable organizations are cast in
the "Goliath" role and the targeted organization is the "David," it does
anecdotally appear that communities are also reacting to the
overreaching nature of the trademark claims.2 84
3. Credible Shamers
The last condition, that the shamers of the trademark bullies be
credible within the community, is also likely present in the nonprofit
sector. 285 Shamers of charitable trademark bullies can include targeted

279.
TODAY

See Brent Schrotenboer, Livestrong Adjusts to Life without Lance Armstrong, USA
SPORTS
(May
4,
2016,
8:25
AM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/

sports/cycling/2016/05/04/livestrong-cancer-lance-armstrong-donations/83619386/.
280. See id.
281.
See Joe O'Connor, Lance Armstrong Doping Scandal Takes Shine Off Yellow AntiCancer Livestrong Bracelets, NAT'L
POST
(Oct.
19,
2012,
at
8:39
PM),
http://news.nationalpost.com/sports/lance-armstrong-doping-scandal-takes-shine-off-yellow-anticancer-livestrong-bracelets.
282.
See,
e.g.,
About,
WOMEN
FOR
WOUNDED
WARRIORS,
http://womenforwoundedwarriors.org/about/ (below the copyright line on the "About" page, "In
light of the recent accusations surrounding Wounded Warrior Project, we'd like to acknowledge that

we are in no way affiliated with their organization. 100% of funds donated to Women for Wounded
Warriors is used to aid wounded veterans and their families.") (last visited Mar. 5, 2017).
283. Grinvald, Shaming, supra note 17, at 671.
284.

See Gayle A. Sulik, Susan G. Komen for the Cure@ Sells out the Pink to Get the Green,

OUPBLOG (Jan. 24, 2011), https://blog.oup.com/201 1/01/komen/.
285.

Grinvald, Shaming, supranote 17, at 674.
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small charitable organizations, news media, independent "watch dog"
organizations, celebrities, and community members.28 6 Effective
shaming does require this last condition, as the community needs to
believe in the shamer in order to turn its back on the trademark bully.
This is perhaps where the targeted charitable organization can be more
assertive in framing the shaming themselves instead of allowing others
to do so for them. This not only ensures that the shaming is effective, but
that it also remains responsible. Uploading the cease-and-desist letter,
having founders talk to media, and tweeting about the bullying are all
ways that the targeted organization can take charge of the shaming. If
the targeted organization allows for others to shame the charitable
trademark bully, the shaming may not be effective (depending on who
takes charge of the shaming), and it may not remain responsible.
Irresponsible shaming can cause a backlash syndrome, where the
targeted organization is also accused of not acting within shared legal
norms of appropriate behavior.
In sum, responsible shaming can be an effective, cost-efficient,
non-legal tool that small charitable organizations can use to defend
themselves against trademark bullying, just like small businesses and
individuals. If a social media post by a targeted organization goes viral,
there is no telling how quickly the bullying can end.287
IV. CONCLUSION

While many charitable organizations attempt to show restraint in
their trademark enforcement efforts, there are times when they cross the
286. See, e.g., Home, CHARITY WATCH, www.charitywatch.org (reviewing how well
charitable organizations are living up to their mission based how donations are spent) (" We dive
deep to let you know how efficiently a charity will use your donation to fund the programs you want

to support.") (last visited Mar. 5, 2017).
287. See, e.g., Jean Hopfensperger, Lawsuits for the Cure?, STAR TRIBUNE, (Jun. 1, 2011,
9:44 AM), http://www.startribune.com/lawsuits-for-the-cure/122911838/ (reporting that the Komen

Foundation dropped its trademark opposition against "Mush for a Cure" "shortly" after the
trademark bullying was highlighted). In the for-profit world (but one involving a small business),
the dispute involving Katy Perry and her claims on "Left Shark," the viral post-Superbowl XLIX
sensation, also shows how fast intellectual property bullies drop their enforcement claims once the

public takes the target's side. See Staci Zaretsky, Katy Perry's Biglaw Firm Sends out 'Left Shark'
Cease & Desist Letter, ABOVE THE LAW (Feb. 6, 2015, at 11:55 AM),
http://abovethelaw.com/2015/02/katy-perrys-biglaw-firm-sends-out-left-shark-cease-desist-letter/

(reporting on the Left Shark dispute). Katy Perry's law firm sent the cease-and-desist letter to
Fernando Sosa on February 5, 2015. Professor Sprigman, who represented Mr. Sosa, sent his

response on February 9, 2015 and as of the date of this article, Fernando Sosa's Etsy shop is still
featuring the Left Shark figurine. See id (posting the cease-and-desist letter and Professor
Sprigman's response); Fernando Sosa s Profile, ETSY.COM, https://www.etsy.com/shop/amznfx

(last visited Mar. 5, 2017).
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line. In fact, the current legal environment appears to encourage this
charitable trademark bullying. The negative externalities stemming from
charitable trademark bullying are quite serious. A reduction in the
number of charitable organizations working in the same area would
mean that complementary services are reduced or forgone. Additionally,
a reduction in the number of organizations altogether would mean that
larger organizations have a defacto monopoly on the causes that society
should fund, and therefore, care about. Both would harm society deeply
at the micro and macro levels. I argue that we should tweak some
pleading requirements in relation to trademark infringement lawsuits to
hopefully lessen the number of lawsuits brought, and in turn, lessen the
extra-judicial charitable trademark bullying. I further argue that
responsible shaming of charitable trademark bullies would be an
effective tool for targeted organizations to use to fight back due to the
amplified vulnerability of charitable organizations to shaming and the
connected communities. All of these steps, taken together, should allow
charitable organizations to focus on their missions and to better society
for all of us.

